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INTRODUCTION 
Scholars have recently begun to contemplate the prospect of “per-
vasive computing,” with data-processing capacity and cues to digital 
data ubiquitously embedded in devices distributed throughout the 
human environment.1  Pervasive computing still lies in the future, but 
in the last half-decade we have begun to experience the reality of per-
vasive image capture.2 
As digital technology proliferates in camera phones, iPhones, and 
PDAs, almost any image we observe can be costlessly recorded, freely 
reproduced, and instantly transmitted worldwide.  We live, relate, work, 
and decide in a world where image capture from life is routine, and 
captured images are part of ongoing discourse, both public and private.  
Capture of images has become an adjunct to memory and an accepted 
medium of connection and correspondence.  Digitally captured memo-
ries, in turn, precipitate conflicts between governmental authority and 
free expression. 
In the aftermath of the Iranian election during the summer of 
2009, authorities sought to impede reporting on efforts to suppress 
opposition demonstrators.  Yet cell phone videos disseminated over 
social-networking sites illuminated both official abuse and the scope 
of civil resistance.  The most striking images, depicting the shooting 
death of Neda Agha-Soltan, were captured by nearby owners of cell 
phone cameras, e-mailed to a series of correspondents outside the 
country, posted on Facebook and YouTube, and then broadcast by 
conventional media the same day.3  In the United States, amid arrests 
of inconvenient photographers at the 2009 G-20 Summit in Pitts-
burgh, images of efforts to suppress demonstrations documented on 
amateur digital video followed a similar route to public cognizance.4 
 
1 E.g., Jerry Kang & Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing:  Embedding the Public Sphere, 62 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93 (2005). 
2 I borrow the felicitous phrase “pervasive image capture” from a proposal written 
for the PICS workshop at UbiComp 2005, the Seventh International Conference on Ubi-
quitous Computing.  Mirjana Spasojevic et al., Pervasive Image Capture and Sharing:  
New Social Practices and Implications for Technology (2005) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.spasojevic.org/pics/PICS/UbicompCamphoneFinal.pdf.  For the 
purposes of this Article, captured “images” can be either visual or aural:  the analysis ap-
plies to recordings in digital media of humanly perceivable sensory inputs. 
3 See Brian Stelter & Brad Stone, In a Death Seen Around the World, a Symbol of Ira-
nian Protests:  Web Pries Lid of Censorship a Bit, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at A1. 
4 See, e.g., Don Babwin, Chicago Police Probed for Posing with Suspect, SOUTHTOWN 
STAR (Chicago), Oct. 17, 2009, at A28, available at 2009 WLNR 21936697 (“The Chicago 
Police Department . . . began investigating the Pittsburgh claims [of police misconduct] 
after video of the alleged incident was posted on YouTube.”); Marty Levine, Image Prob-
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At the boundary between public and private, conservative activists 
Hannah Giles and James O’Keefe impersonated a prostitute and a 
procurer seeking aid from local offices of the Association of Commu-
nity Organization for Reform Now (ACORN) and surreptitiously cap-
tured images of the resulting interactions.  The videos, initially posted 
on YouTube and a conservative website, rapidly spread to generate 
mainstream political controversy.5  ACORN brought suit claiming that 
the image capture constituted an invasion of privacy and a violation of 
state wiretapping statutes.6 
A similar dynamic unfolds in more personal contexts.  The phe-
nomenon of “sexting,” in which owners of digital cameras capture 
their own nude or revealing images and convey them by text message 
or e-mail—with the accompanying danger of retransmission—has be-
come increasingly prevalent with ubiquitous ownership of cell phone 
cameras.7  Law enforcement authorities have taken alarm, and they 
 
lem:  Did Cops Target Cameras During G20?, PITTSBURGH CITY PAPER, Oct. 14–21, 2009, at 
6 (describing arrests of photographers and independent media activists during G-20 
demonstrations); Kurt Nimmo, Video from G20 the Corporate Media Will Never Show You, 
INFOWARS (Sept. 25, 2009), http://www.infowars.com/video-from-g20-the-corporate-
media-will-never-show-you (linking to YouTube videos showing the police advancing 
on students in Pittsburgh). 
5 See, e.g., Darryl Fears & Carol D. Leonnig, The $1,300 Mission to Fell ACORN:  Duo in 
Sting Video Say Their Effort Was Independent, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2009, at A1; Scott 
Shane, A Political Gadfly Lampoons the Left via YouTube, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2009, at 
A9; Howard Kurtz, Guerrilla Journalism, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2009, http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/25/AR2009092501130.html.  
6 Complaint, ACORN v. O’Keefe, No. 90-6238 (Cir. Ct. Balt. City Sept. 23, 
2009); see also Carol D. Leonnig, ACORN Sues over Damaging Video, WASH. POST, Sept. 
24, 2009, at A4. 
7 See KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS, THE MTV-ASSOCIATED PRESS POLL:  DIGITAL ABUSE 
SURVEY (2009),  http://www.athinline.org/MTV-AP_Digital_Abuse_Study_Full.pdf; MTV 
& THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, A THIN LINE:  2009 AP-MTV DIGITAL ABUSE STUDY (2009), 
http://www.athinline.org/MTV-AP_Digital_Abuse_Study_Executive_Summary.pdf.  To-
gether, these reports indicate that of the 1247 respondents aged 14 to 24, 81% owned 
cell phones with cameras.  Additionally, 33% of respondents aged 18 to 24 and 24% of 
the respondents aged 14 to 17 had sent or received a naked image by text message or e-
mail.  Finally, 10% of the respondents had sent a naked image of themselves, and the ma-
jority of the images were transmitted to actual or potential romantic partners.  See also 
COX COMMUNICATIONS, TEEN ONLINE & WIRELESS SAFETY SURVEY:  CYBERBULLYING, 
SEXTING, AND PARENTAL CONTROLS 36, 41 (2009), http://www.cox.com/takecharge/ 
safe_teens_2009/media/2009_teen_survey_internet_and_wireless_safety.pdf (reporting 
that 9% of thirteen-year-olds surveyed either sent or received sexually suggestive nude or 
nearly nude digital images by text message or e-mail; that this figure rose to 24% of se-
venteen-year-olds; and that the vast majority of recipients were actual or potential roman-
tic partners); THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY 
& COSMOGIRL.COM, SEX AND TECH:  RESULTS FROM A SURVEY OF TEENS AND YOUNG 
ADULTS 1, 11-12 (2008), http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/PDF/SexTech_ 
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have responded by invoking child pornography and obscenity statutes 
to threaten prosecution of underage sexters.8 
These clashes between image capture and attempted suppression 
are typical, but hardly exhaustive.  In the next decade, the prolifera-
tion of digital visual capacity will regularly require legal decision-
makers to come to grips with the status of pervasive image capture 
under the First Amendment.  This Article commences the task. 
I begin by parsing the technological trends that have set the stage 
for pervasive image capture as a social practice and proceed to sketch 
the emerging ecology of visual memory and discourse.  I then canvass 
legal developments that threaten to shadow the promise of the new 
medium and discuss their proper analysis under the First Amend-
ment.  I argue against claims of earlier analysts that the process of re-
cording images constitutes unprotected action.  In today’s world, per-
sonal image capture is part of a medium of expression entitled to First 
Amendment cognizance.  I close with an initial account of the First 
Amendment protections of pervasive image capture. 
I.  THE EMERGING TECHNOLOGY OF PERVASIVE IMAGE CAPTURE 
Three developments converge to form the new reality of pervasive 
image capture:  digital photographic capability merges synergistically 
with the ubiquity of the cell phone camera and the growth of online 
venues for image sharing. 
Digital cameras, introduced to the public in 1997,9 have driven the 
marginal monetary cost of recording and saving images toward zero.  
 
Summary.pdf (reporting that 20% of respondents aged 13 to 19 had sent or posted “a 
nude or semi-nude picture[] or video” of themselves; that 31% had received such an 
image; and that the vast majority of these images were sent to romantic partners). 
8 See, e.g., State v. Canal, 773 N.W. 2d 528, 529 (Iowa 2009) (affirming obscenity 
conviction for sexting); Nancy Rommelmann, Anatomy of a Child Pornographer, REASON, 
July 2009, at 30-37 (discussing the growing trend of sexting prosecutions); Sexting in the 
News, PC’S N DREAMS, http://www.pcsndreams.com/Pages/News.htm#Sexting (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2010) (providing a news feed of sexting investigations and prosecu-
tions).  For a discussion of legislative and judicial action related to sexting, see also infra 
notes 70-71. 
 Readers should be aware that I served on the counsel team representing teenage 
girls along with their parents in a case in which the girls were threatened with child por-
nography prosecution for appearing in digital photographs from the waist up clad in 
white opaque brassieres.  The prosecution was preliminarily enjoined in Miller v. Skuma-
nick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 647 (M.D. Pa. 2009); the injunction was affirmed in Miller v. 
Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2010); a final injunction was entered by consent in 
Miller v. Mitchell, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42512, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2010).  
9 See Mark Halper, The Digital Camera Fights for Survival, TIME, Aug. 13, 2006, 
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Freed of the expense of film, developing, and printing, a digital cam-
era owner can capture almost any number of images without effective 
monetary constraint.  Once captured, digital images can be repro-
duced and disseminated like any other data; digital images flow fric-
tionlessly from cables to flash drives, to e-mail and web pages.10  Digital 
cameras began to outnumber film cameras in the United States in 
2003, and today more than two-thirds of Americans own digital cam-
eras.11  Similarly, video cameras, priced at $1500 in 1992, are available 
in digital versions today for less than a tenth of that cost, and digital 
image capture technology is increasingly available in a variety of inex-
pensive and ubiquitous personal digital devices.12 
Cell phone cameras, introduced in the United States in 2002,13 
have radically reduced the nonmonetary cost of image capture.  In 
modern life, cell phones constantly accompany their users.  They com-
bine effortless and immediately accessible digital photographic capa-
bility with the capacity to transmit captured images instantaneously.14  
 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1226058,00.html (“[D]igital cam-
eras hit the mass market in 1997 . . . .”).  
10 See PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCS. INT’L FOR THE PEW INTERNET & 
AM. LIFE PROJECT, ANNUAL GADGETS SURVEY 2007, at 21 (2007), http:// 
www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Questionnaire/2009/PIAL%20Gadgets07%20
FINAL%20Topline_1213.pdf [hereinafter ANNUAL GADGETS SURVEY 2007] (reporting 
that 70% of respondents shared photos through e-mail and that 34% posted photos on 
the Internet). 
11 See id. at 15 (reporting that 62% of respondents owned digital cameras); Halper, 
supra note 9 (reporting that digital cameras were adopted so universally that the mar-
ket may have reached saturation); Digital Cameras—Whereto?, SOFTPEDIA (Mar. 21, 2005, 
7:45 GMT), http://news.softpedia.com/news/Digital-cameras-whereto-709.shtml (not-
ing that, in 2003, digital camera sales outnumbered those of classical cameras for the 
first time and that digital camera sales have been increasing since). 
12 See, e.g., Peter Gabriel et al., Moving Images:  Witness and Human Rights Advocacy, 
INNOVATIONS:  TECHNOLOGY, GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION, Spring 2008, at 35, 50 
(explaining how Witness, a human rights organization, is transforming because of the 
availability and widespread adoption of recording tools and noting the drop in the 
pricing of such technology); ANNUAL GADGETS SURVEY 2007, supra note 10, at 15 (re-
porting that 41% of respondents owned video cameras). 
13 A Camera in Every Cellphone, AMERICANHERITAGE.COM, http:// 
www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/it/2010/4/2010_4_18.shtml (last vi-
sited Oct. 15, 2010) (“Sprint introduced the Sanyo SCP-5300, the first cellcam available 
to American consumers, in December 2002.”).  
14 See, e.g., AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, TEENS AND MO-
BILE PHONES OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS:  PEW INTERNET LOOKS BACK 4 (2009), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2009/PIP%20Teens%20and%
20Mobile%20Phones%20Data%20Memo.pdf (reporting that 77% of American adults, 
and 71% of teenagers owned cell phones in 2008); ANNUAL GADGETS SURVEY 2007, su-
pra note 10, at 16 (reporting that 58% of American cell phone owners use their phones 
to take pictures). 
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In modern America, cell phone ownership is on its way to becoming 
universal, and virtually every cell phone has digital image capacity.15 
Finally, during the last five years, distribution channels for digitial 
images have expanded exponentially.  Social networking sites like Face-
book, along with sites like Flickr, YouTube, and TwitPic, have combined 
with increasingly usable blogging technology to enable any holder of an 
image to make it instantly available to the world at large.16 
II.  THE OPPORTUNITIES OF IMAGE CAPTURE:  THE                              
DISCURSIVE ECOLOGY OF DIGITAL IMAGES 
Pervasive image capture opens both personal and political oppor-
tunities; the capture of digital images is a part of an emerging ecology 
of memory and discourse linking holders of cell phones, iPhones, 
PDAs, and computers.  At the personal level, the diffusion of image-
capture technologies provides channels to create life records, to con-
nect with others, and to exercise creative capacities.  In public dis-
course, pervasive image capture allows its users to hold public actors 
accountable and to participate effectively in public dialogue. 
A.  Enrichment of Private Lives 
Users of camera phones typically deploy the devices to enrich 
their private lives.  They augment their memories with captured im-
 
15 See, e.g., For Everyday Photography, Cell Phones Are Growing as Camera of Choice, BUSI-
NESS WIRE, July 8, 2008 [hereinafter For Everyday Photography], available at Westlaw, 
7/8/08 Bus. Wire 13:34:00 (“A whopping 96.3% of adult cell phone owners report that 
they have a cell phone with a camera.”); Kristy Clairmont, PMA Data Watch:  Camera 
Phone Penetration Continues to Rise, PMA FORESIGHT (Mar. 15, 2010), http:// 
pmaforesight.com/?p=402 [hereinafter PMA Data Watch] (reporting that, in 2009, more 
than 60% of households owned camera phones); AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW IN-
TERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, SOCIAL MEDIA & MOBILE INTERNET USE AMONG TEENS 
AND YOUNG ADULTS 4 (2010), http://pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2010/ 
PIP_Social_Media_and_Young_Adults_Report_final_with_toplines.pdf (“Three quarters 
(75%) of teens and 93% of adults aged 18-29 now have a cell phone.”). 
16 See FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/facebook?v=info&ref=pf (last vi-
sited Oct. 15, 2010) (listing the founding date of Facebook as February 4, 2004); 
FLICKR, http://blog.flickr.net/en/2004/02/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (discussing 
the February 2004 launch of Flickr); TwitPic, TwitPic Company Profile, LINKEDIN, 
http://linkedin.com/companies/twitpic (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (providing Twit-
Pic founding date of 2008); YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/about (last vi-
sited Oct. 15, 2010) (stating that YouTube was founded in February 2005); see also 
Kristen Nicole, Twit Pic.  It’s for Twitter Pictures, Of Course, MASHABLE, (Feb. 5, 2008), 
http://mashable.com/2008/02/05/twit-pic (explaining that TwitPic allows users to 
add images to their Twitter streams). 
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ages.  They strengthen personal bonds by sharing images with others.  
They create works of visual authorship. 
Visual memory is notoriously thin and unreliable.17  In response, 
camera-phone users ubiquitously capture and archive images to 
record their experiences for future reference.18  Regular and costless 
image capture reinforces a sense that quotidian images are worthy of 
retention and potential recall.19  And, in turn, the perceived worth of 
the images encourages their further capture. 
Modern life is increasingly atomized and centrifugal; pervasive 
image capture allows users to build and nurture interpersonal connec-
tions.  Camera-phone users capture images to share their lives with 
 
17 Cf. Guys and Dolls, WIKIQUOTE, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Guys_and_Dolls 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (“SKY MASTERSON:  However, if you are really looking for 
some action, I will bet you the same thousand that you do not know the color of neck-
tie you are currently wearing.  (puts hand on top of Nathan’s tie)  Well?  NATHAN DE-
TROIT:  . . . No bet.  (Sky removes his hand) Polka Dots!  Only Nathan Detroit could blow 
a bet on polka dots!”). 
18 See Tim Kindberg et al., The Ubiquitous Camera:  An In-Depth Study of Camera Phone 
Use, IEEE PERVASIVE COMPUTING, Apr.–June 2005, at 42, 45 (reporting that 41% of im-
ages were captured for the purpose of “personal reflection or reminiscing”); Nancy A. 
Van House & Marc Davis, The Social Life of Cameraphone Images 2 (2005) (unpub-
lished manuscript prepared for the PICS workshop, UbiComp 2005), available at 
http://www.spasojevic.org/pics/PICS/van_house_and_davis.pdf (“Images are used, to 
preserve memories, but also to construct indiviidual [sic] and group narratives of one-
self and one’s life.”); For Everyday Photography, supra note 15, at 2 (“46.4% of all adults 
and 2/3 of adults age 18-30 say that they use their cell phone to snap self-
portraits. . . . ‘Fifty-eight percent of adults age 18-30 tell us they use their camera 
phones to document nightlife.’” (quoting Scott Abelman, Senior Vice President of 
Marketing at Wirefly.com)); PMA Data Watch, supra note 15 (“Forty-three percent of 
camera phone owners take pictures with the camera phone so they can have the pic-
ture with them at all times.”); see also Anna Reading, Memobilia:  The Mobile Phone and the 
Emergence of Wearable Memories (arguing that mobile phones contribute significantly to 
digital memory), in SAVE AS . . . DIGITAL MEMORIES 81, 81-92 ( Joanne Garde-Hansen 
et al. eds., 2009). 
19 See, e.g., Okabe Daisuke & Mizuko Ito, Camera Phones Changing the Definition of 
Picture-worthy, JAPAN MEDIA REV., Aug. 29, 2003, http://www.ojr.org/japan/wireless/ 
1062208524.php (describing the camera phone as an “intimate and ubiquitous pres-
ence that invites a new kind of personal awareness, a persistent alertness to the visually 
newsworthy,” and noting that camera-phone users reported that they took photos 
mostly of “‘things that they happened upon that were interesting,’” as well as, in de-
creasing amounts, family members, friends, themselves, pets, and travel (quoting a sur-
vey by IPSE Marketing)); see also GERARD GOGGIN, CELL PHONE CULTURE 145-47 
(2006) (explaining that studies on the use of camera-phones share “a strong emphasis 
on the embededness in an orientation of the camera phone towards a technology of 
everyday life”); JOSÉ VAN DIJCK, MEDIATED MEMORIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 113 (2007) 
(“Since the 1990s . . . cameras increasingly serve as tools for mediating quotidian expe-
riences other than rituals or ceremonial moments.”). 
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friends and family.20  Particular shared images convey information, 
perceptions, stories, or emotions; the stream of shared images estab-
lishes a sense of “co-presence” in correspondents’ lives.21 
Pervasive image capture provides the raw material of visual aes-
thetic works.22  The increasingly broad availability of costless image 
capture and storage enables every owner of a cell phone or PDA to 
practice the craft of the photographer or the filmmaker.  With the 
emergence of Photoshop and its relatives, art previously confined to 
the darkroom and the studio is open to all members of the digerati; 
anyone with an iPhone can achieve visual expression that a decade 
ago was confined to cinematographers.23  This efflorescence of photo-
graphic and videographic expression enriches the lives of practition-
ers at least as much as it enlivens those of viewers. 
 
20 See, e.g., Kindberg et al., supra note 18, at 45 (reporting that 35% of images are 
“intended to enrich a shared experience,” and 21% are intended for communication to 
absent family and friends); For Everyday Photography, supra note 15 (stating that 38.6% of 
camera-phone photos are sent to friends and adding that 13.9% of adults and 28.1% of 
respondents aged 18 to 30 report having sent a “flirtatious, suggestive, or nude photo”). 
21 See, e.g., Tim Kindberg et al., I Saw This and Thought of You:  Some Social Uses of 
Camera Phones, in CHI ’05 EXTENDED ABSTRACTS ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING 
SYSTEMS 1545, 1546 (2005), available at http://portal.acm.org/ft_gateway.cfm?id= 
1056962&type=pdf&CFID=116614411&CFTOKEN=54905948; Kindberg et al., supra 
note 18, at 46; Nancy A. Van House, Flickr and Public Image-Sharing:  Distant Closeness and 
Photo Exhibition, in CHI ‘07 EXTENDED ABSTRACTS ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING 
SYSTEMS 2717, 2718-20 (2007), available at http://portal.acm.org/ft_gateway.cfm?id= 
1241068&type=pdf&CFID=116614411&CFTOKEN=54905948; Amy Voida & Elizabeth 
D. Mynatt, Six Themes of the Communicative Appropriation of Photographic Images, in CHI 
2005:  CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS, CONFERENCE PRO-
CEEDINGS 171, 171 (2005); Mizuko Ito, Intimate Visual Co-Presence 1 (2005) (unpub-
lished manuscript prepared for the PICS Workshop, UbiComp 2005), available at 
http://www.spasojevic.org/pics/PICS/ito.ubicomp05.pdf; Van House, supra note 18, 
at 2;  Nancy A. Van House, Distant Closeness:  Cameraphones and Public Image Shar-
ing (2006) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the PICS Workshop, UbiComp 
2006, the Eighth International Conference on Ubiquitous Computing), available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.114.8102&rep=rep1&type=
pdf; see also VAN DIJCK, supra note 19, at 112-18 (reporting the evolution among young-
er users of digital photography “from memory tools to communication devices, and 
from sharing (memory) objects to sharing experiences”). 
22 See, e.g., For Everyday Photography, supra note 15, at 2 (stating that 45.4% of pho-
tos taken on a cell phone are used as wallpaper design for the phone’s home screen). 
23 See, e.g., Frank Beacham, The Impact of Mobile Technology, TV TECH. (July 20, 2009), 
http://www.tvtechnology.com/article/84134 (“The new iPhone 3GS . . . democratizes 
video . . . . [A]nyone with about $300 in their pocket [can] become a TV producer with a 
potential global market.”). 
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B.  Public Discourse and Accountability 
Pervasive image capture enhances public discourse.  Premeditated 
efforts to record publicly relevant occurrences are bolstered by the 
continual accretion of images from spontaneous image capture.  Im-
ages, unlike words, do not demand great literary ability, or even litera-
cy, for persuasiveness; they provide apparently robust verification that 
does not depend on the reputation of the proponent.  In the emerg-
ing digital environment, broadly available and marginally costless im-
age capture provides potential access to public dialogue for individu-
als and groups without firm economic or political bases or established 
public credibility.  Image capture therefore has the virtue, like leaf-
leting and house signs, of providing “an unusually cheap and conve-
nient form of communication . . . [e]specially for persons of modest 
means or limited mobility.”24  The last decade has seen increasingly 
important use of both targeted and spontaneous image capture as 
foundations for public discourse. 
1.  Premeditated Image Capture 
Images captured by chroniclers of public dramas lend impact and 
immediacy to public discourse.  Political activists increasingly substan-
tiate and dramatize claims with videos.25  Political campaigns accumu-
late public records of opponents’ statements by instructing campaign 
workers to capture images of the opponent on the campaign trail.26  In 
 
24 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 57 (1994).  The Court in City of Ladue held that 
a city’s “ban on almost all residential signs violate[d] the First Amendment.”  Id. at 58;  see 
also Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (upholding the right to distribute 
leaflets door-to-door as “essential to the poorly financed causes of little people”). 
25 See, e.g., THOMAS HARDING, THE VIDEO ACTIVIST HANDBOOK 69-73 (2d ed. 2001) 
(citing examples of videos used to support a claim of wrongdoing); Roumen Dimitrov, 
Acting Strategically:  Skilled Communication by Australian Refugee Advocacy Groups, GLOBAL 
MEDIA J.—AUSTRALIAN EDITION, no. 2, 2008, http://www.commarts.uws.edu.au/ 
gmjau/iss2_2008/pdf/GMJ%20Roumen%20Dimitrov%20v2_1%202008.pdf (observing 
that “resource-poor groups . . . too weak to elevate . . . their problems to a higher level 
of significance” used video advocacy to gain access to the public arena); Getting Bur-
mese Atrocities on Camera (National Public Radio broadcast Dec. 9, 2006), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6602518 (detailing human 
rights activists’ use of video cameras in Burma to document government atrocities). 
26 In one striking example, the 2008 senatorial campaign of Jim Webb captured 
images of Webb’s opponent, Senator George Allen, denigrating Webb’s photographer, 
S.R. Sidarth, with the racist epithet “macaca.”  The incident was then disseminated on 
YouTube, Zkman, George Allen Introduces Macaca (Aug. 15, 2006), http:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=r90z0PMnKwI, and later picked up by other media.  Al-
len’s campaign crumbled.  See Tim Craig, The ‘What If’ of Allen Haunts the GOP Race, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2008, at B1. 
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smaller gatherings, citizen journalists capture words of politicians that 
are difficult to disavow to a broader public.27  Recorded interactions at 
public meetings establish a shared basis of knowledge for public dis-
cussion and critique.28 
Image capture can document activities that are proper subjects of 
public deliberation but which the protagonists would prefer to keep 
hidden and deniable.  Animal rights activists regularly seek to record 
and publicize what they regard as graphic examples of animal abuse.29  
Conservative activists seek to capture and publish images of their op-
ponents engaged in activities that the activists believe the public would 
oppose.30  Human rights campaigners document violations of humani-
tarian norms.31  News organizations place dubious police tactics on the 
public record.32 
 
27 See, e.g., ERIC BOEHLERT, BLOGGERS ON THE BUS 166-71 (2009) (describing 
campaign donor Mayhill Fowler’s recording of then-Senator Barack Obama’s com-
ments about “bitter” Pennsylvanians delivered in a 2008 fundraising meeting in San 
Francisco and the subsequent publishing of the recording on Huffington Post).   
28 See, e.g., Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120, 121 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) 
(protecting a fathers’ rights group’s interest in filming public meetings of a rules com-
mittee); Iacobucci v. Boulter, No. 94-10531, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7010, at *19-20 (D. 
Mass. Mar. 26, 1997) (protecting an independent reporter’s videotaping of a public 
meeting of the town historical commission); Thompson v. City of Clio, 765 F. Supp. 1066, 
1070 (M.D. Ala. 1991) (holding that proscription of the tape recording of a city council 
meeting “regulates conduct protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment”); Tarus v. Borough 
of Pine Hill, 916 A.2d 1036, 1039 (N.J. 2007) (holding that a municipal “watchdog” had 
the right to videotape a borough council meeting); Maurice River Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Maurice River Twp. Teachers Ass’n, 475 A.2d 59, 61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) 
(holding that a teachers’ union was entitled to videotape school board meetings); Csorny 
v. Shoreham-Wading River Cent. Sch. Dist., 759 N.Y.S.2d 513, 519 (App. Div. 2003) (pro-
tecting the right of parents to videotape a school-board meeting). 
29 See, e.g., S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks Serving Summit Cnty., 499 F.3d 553, 561-62 
(6th Cir. 2007) (discussing the lawfulness of a recording taken in a public park during 
a deer-culling operation); Cuviello v. City of Stockton, No. 07-1625, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4896, at *76-79 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2009) (enforcing an injunction to allow a 
group to record alleged animal abuse by a circus); Cuviello v. City of Oakland, No. 06-
5517, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59833, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2007) (granting a pre-
liminary injunction to allow an organization to film animal abuse by a circus from pub-
lic property); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 
P.2d 1269, 1280 (Nev. 1995) (reviewing the videotaping of an entertainer disciplining 
orangutans backstage).  
30 E.g., Erica Noonan, Activist Seeks Cash for Case, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 18, 2001, at W1 
(describing a conservative activist who recorded segments of an AIDS-prevention work-
shop sponsored by the Gay and Lesbian Student Education Network and provided the 
recordings to local talk radio). 
31 See, e.g., Gabriel et al., supra note 12, at 35-36 (describing the work of Wit-
ness.org, which since 1992 has provided video technology and training to human 
rights activists who document human rights abuses for use in legal action, advocacy, 
and organizing); Sam Gregory, Transnational Storytelling:  Human Rights, WITNESS, and 
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It is increasingly common for participants in situations of conflict 
to deploy image capture techniques.  Law enforcement officials regu-
larly record images to document criminal violations.  Recorded sur-
veillance evidence is typical of many modern prosecutions involving 
“stings,” but police officials have begun to record unscripted interac-
tions as well.33  Conversely, some criminal defendants have relied on 
their own electronic recordings to impeach police accusations,34 while 
others have introduced their video recordings of public conduct to 
rebut claims that they had violated laws or to substantiate misconduct 
by police officials.35 
 
Video Advocacy, 108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 195, 202-04 (2006) (exploring video use for 
local, national, and transnational human rights audiences). 
32 See, e.g., Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 2007) (re-
jecting tort claims against a news media team for filming undercover officers in con-
nection with an alleged incident of sexual assault); Hornberger v. ABC, Inc., 799 A.2d 
566, 571 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (dismissing action against ABC news crews 
filming traffic stops of African American “testers” to investigate racial profiling on the 
New Jersey Turnpike); cf. Cassidy v. ABC, Inc., 377 N.E.2d 126, 131-32 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1978) (holding that a journalist who surreptitiously videotaped an undercover officer 
in a massage parlor during an arrest of a parlor employee did not violate the officer’s 
right of privacy where the officer was “discharging a public duty”).   
 For a somewhat more aggressive sting by an activist who distributed the record on 
the Internet, see Doug Carman, OPD May Investigate Postings, ODESSA AM., Dec. 31, 
2008, at 1A, which describes a police raid of a residence that officers had been led to 
believe was a marijuana grow house:  “when they entered the home they instead found 
Christmas trees under grow lights and a poster telling them they were being 
filmed . . . for a reality TV show.”  See also The KopBusters Story, KOPBUSTERS.COM, 
http://www.nevergetbusted.com/kopbusters/about.php (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) 
(describing the use of video to expose illegal police raids on marijuana grow rooms). 
33 See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 391 n.3 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(discussing evidence based upon video captured by a dash-mounted video camera acti-
vated by police during an effort to apprehend a speeding car); Sharon Noguchi, San 
Jose Police Test Head-Mounted Cameras for Officers, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 18, 
2009, available at LEXIS (describing a “pilot project equipping officers with head-
mounted cameras to document contacts with civilians”); David A. Harris, Picture This:  
Body Worn Video Devices (“Head Cams”) as Tools for Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance 
by Police, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 4-8), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1596901 (describing police ex-
periences with dashboard cameras and “head cams”). 
34 See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, A Switch Is Flipped, and Justice Listens In, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 
2007, at B1 (reporting that a defendant recorded a conversation with a police officer 
and later used the recording in court); Jeanne Meserve & Mike Ahlers, Passenger Says 
TSA Agents Harassed Him, CNN.COM, June 20, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2009/US/06/20/tsa.lawsuit/index.html#cnnSTCText (reporting that a passenger 
used an iPhone to record an interaction with TSA agents, resulting in a disciplinary 
action against one agent as well as a lawsuit against Homeland Security Secretary 
Janet Napolitano). 
35 See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, One Protest, 52 Arrests and a $2 Million Payout, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 20, 2008, at B1 (reporting on a video which showed that arrested protestors had 
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Captured images need not be conveyed to others to have a salutary 
effect.  Just as public surveillance cameras are said to reduce crime, the 
prospect of private image capture provides a deterrent to official actions 
that would evoke liability or condemnation.36  Images allow victims to 
claim their voice and to leverage widely held norms to shame violators.37 
2.  Ambient Image Capture 
As image-capture capability has diffused, publicly salient images 
emerge not only from premeditated efforts to prepare for public di-
alogue, but from recordings by serendipitous amateur photographers.  
The iconic videotapes of the beating of Rodney King in 1991 were 
recorded by a plumbing shop manager, George Holliday, who was 
 
not, in fact, blocked pedestrians as charged); Jim Dwyer, Videos Challenge Hundreds of 
Convention Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2005, at A1 (discussing the use of video to rebut 
allegations of resisting arrest and impeach claims of officers that defendants engaged 
in misconduct); cf. Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155, 156-57 (11th Cir. 1995) (per cu-
riam) (reviewing an action against a police officer who seized the film of and arrested 
a participant who had been photographing undercover officers at a demonstration); 
Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995) (sustaining the claim of the 
plaintiff who videotaped police at a demonstration and overturning summary judg-
ment below); Campbell Clark et al., Sûreté du Québec to Review Practices, GLOBE & MAIL 
(TORONTO), Aug. 25, 2007, at A5, available at 2007 WLNR 16583215 (reporting that 
video recorded by demonstrators showed identifiable police agents acting as provoca-
teurs seeking to instigate violence and resistance among demonstrators).  Footage of 
the Quebec protest is available at CanadiansNanaimo, Stop SPP Protest-Union Leader 
Stops Provocateurs (Aug. 20, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=St1-WTc1kow. 
36 See, e.g., HARDING, supra note 25, at 65-67 (describing examples of video “pacify-
ing” potential conflicts with officials); Gabriel et al., supra note 12, at 44 (describing 
“[v]ideo filming as a deterrent to further abuse”); Karen Auge, Images Capture Big Show:  
Protesters, Celebrity Fans and the Curious Are Taking Videos and Pictures Outside the DNC, 
DENVER POST, Aug. 28, 2008, at P-17, available at 2008 WLNR 16257906 (“CopWatch 
has been trailing Denver police for years, videotaping confrontations with large 
groups . . . . [D]emonstrators . . . have made sure that cameras are rolling as they 
traipse through Denver streets.” (citing Steve Nash, founder of CopWatch)); Residents 
Given Video Cameras to Monitor Cops, MSNBC.COM, June 20, 2007, http:// 
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19340005/ (reporting that the ACLU distributed video cam-
eras to residents of “high-crime neighborhoods” to help monitor police conduct). 
 The tactic of using cameras to defend against abuses by officials is not new.  See 
Charles E. Jones, The Political Repression of the Black Panther Party 1966–1971:  The Case of 
the Oakland Bay Area, 18 J. BLACK STUD. 415, 417 (1988) (reporting on the “Panther 
Police Patrol,” which deployed tape recorders and cameras to document police stops), 
cited in Regina Austin, The Next “New Wave”:  Law-Genre Documentaries, Lawyering in Sup-
port of the Creative Process, and Visual Legal Advocacy, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J., 809, 865 n.166 (2006). 
37 See HOLLABACK!, http://www.ihollaback.org/about (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) 
(featuring photos and stories about “street harassers” in an effort to empower women 
and people who identify as LGBTQ to “holla back” at men who sexually harass them in 
public areas). 
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awakened by noise outside of his window.38  Holliday captured the un-
folding arrest and beating on a video camera he had bought a month 
before to record friends and family.39  After his attempts to share the 
tape with the Los Angeles police department were rebuffed, he sub-
mitted the tape to a local television station that aired a segment and 
offered it to CNN for syndication.40 
Today, cell phones provide constant and costless opportunities to 
capture images—opportunities that generate a burgeoning social 
practice of recording images from daily life.41  The resulting records 
provide an underpinning of corroboration and salience to events that 
otherwise might have been briefly observed ephemera. 
In the 2004 Asian tsunami and the 2005 London Tube bombings, 
cell phone videos were uploaded to publicly available websites and ra-
pidly emerged as the foundation of public deliberation.42  Digital pic-
tures of the abuses at Abu Ghraib recorded by American service 
members documenting their daily lives catalyzed both internal inves-
 
38 See John Carman, The Story Behind the King Videotape, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 
10, 1992, at 3A, available at 1992 WLNR 2056138 (chronicling the origins of the Rod-
ney King video). 
39 Id. 
40 Id.; see also Photographer of Inglewood Incident Arrested; Why Did Inglewood Of-
ficer Strike Handcuffed Teen?, CNN CONNIE CHUNG TONIGHT (CNN television broadcast 
July 11, 2002), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0207/11/cct.00.html (quot-
ing George Holliday explaining to the announcer, “I called the police department and 
they pretty much hung up on me.  I was even before [sic] I could mention I had a tape of 
it.  So then I called Channel 5.”).  
 The Sony Handycam was developed in 1985 and became widely available shortly 
thereafter.  See Ron Sanchez & D. Sudharshan, Real-Time Market Research, 11 MARKET-
ING INTELLIGENCE & PLAN., no. 7, 1993, at 34-35;  cf. Lambert v. Polk County, 723 F. 
Supp. 128, 133 (S.D. Iowa 1989) (recognizing the First Amendment right of a video-
grapher who videotaped a street fight and sought to sell the footage to news media).   
 Digital video began to emerge in the nonprofessional consumer market in 1995.  
See David Brott, Product Probe, VIDEOMAKER, Nov. 1995, at 43.  
41 See sources cited supra notes 18-19.   
42 See, e.g., Anna Reading, Mobile Witnessing:  Ethics and the Camera Phone in the “War 
on Terror,” 6 GLOBALIZATIONS 61, 67-72 (2009) (discussing a widely circulated video of 
the 2005 London Tube bombings taken by a nonjournalist on his mobile camera 
phone); Matea Gold, Cellphones Change the View of Disaster, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 2005, at 
A1 (providing numerous examples of amateur videos that captured the London Tube 
bombings and were broadcast to large audiences by major news networks); Verne Ko-
pytoff, Terror in London:  The Day After, S.F. CHRON., July 9, 2005, at A9, available at 2005 
WLNR 10757533 (noting the substantial increase in publicly available images of the 
Asian tsunami and London Tube bombings due to the growing presence of cell phone 
cameras in the hands of the average individual); Jo Twist, Mobiles Capture Blast After-
math, BBC NEWS, July 8, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4663561.stm 
(explaining that many of the initial images of the London Tube bombings—and some 
of the most publicly recognized ones—were captured by cell phone cameras). 
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tigations and public outrage.43  Spontaneously captured videos pro-
vided iconic images of September 11, 2001, the shootings at Virginia 
Tech, and the death of Saddam Hussein.44 
Images of Iranian demonstrations and repression captured by 
participants and onlookers evaded efforts of the Iranian government 
to suppress media coverage in the aftermath of the 2009 election, 
and digital networks continue to disseminate images of protests.45  In 
the United States, barriers to news gathering are less often official, 
but the decline in resources available to gather news in an industry 
under pressure from online competition poses increasing challenges 
 
43 See, e.g., PHILIP GOUREVITCH & ERROL MORRIS, STANDARD OPERATING PROCE-
DURE 178-79, 262-64 (2008) (describing Abu Ghraib digital photographic documenta-
tion, the submission of photographs to military investigators, and the subsequent effect 
of that submission); Seth F. Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight in a Shadow “War”:  FOIA, the 
Abuses of Anti-Terrorism, and the Strategy of Transparency, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1141, 
1197-208 (2007) (analyzing the submission of Abu Ghraib photographs to U.S. military 
investigators by Specialist Joseph Darby, the ensuing investigations, and the ultimate 
catalytic disclosure of the abuses); Philip Gourevitch, Op-Ed., The Abu Ghraib We Cannot 
See, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2009, at WK10 (discussing the impact of photographs of Abu 
Ghraib taken by American soldiers with digital cameras). 
44 See, e.g., Judi Hetrick, Amateur Video Must Not Be Overlooked, MOVING IMAGE, 
Spring 2006, at 66, 67 (explaining that an amateur video is the only visual record of 
both planes hitting the World Trade Center on 9/11); May Wong, Camera Phone Tech-
nology Creates Cultural Impact, CHI. TRIB., May 28, 2007, § 3, at 5 (reporting that cell 
phone users captured and made public video footage from the shooting at Virginia 
Tech in 2007 and Saddam Hussein’s execution in 2006). 
45 See, e.g., Editorial, Reporting Duty:  Censoring the Foreign Media Hurts, and Diminish-
es Both Iran and Its People, TIMES (London), June 18, 2009, at 2 (commenting that aver-
age Iranians have turned to images and videos captured by cell phones and cameras to 
find the “truth” of what is happening in their country because of the Iranian govern-
ment’s ban on the international press); Christopher Rhoads, Activists Skirt Web Crack-
down to Reach the Outside World, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2009, at A8 (explaining that despite 
crackdown on Iran’s opposition movement, people were still posting videos and other 
media online); Brian Stelter, News Media Relax Their Rules to Cope with Media Ban in Iran, 
INT’L HERALD TRIB., June 30, 2009, at 21, available at 2009 WLNR 12415098 (“In a 
news vacuum, amateur videos and eyewitness accounts became the de facto source for 
information.”); Iran Bans International Journalists from Covering Rallies, CNN.COM, June 
16, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/16/iran.journalists.banned 
(describing the Iranian government’s ban of the international media from reporting 
on opposition rallies protesting the controversial presidential election results); Dave 
Siavashi, Live-blog:  Ashura in Iran-—December 27, 2009, IRAN NEWS NOW (Dec. 26, 2009), 
http://www.irannewsnow.com/2009/12/live-blog-ashura (documenting the clashes 
between Iranian police and protestors on December 27, 2009, through live reporting, 
video feeds, and photographs); Brett Soloman, Ready Set Revolution, CITIZENTUBE 
(Dec. 29, 2009), http://www.citizentube.com/2009/12/ready-set-revolution.html 
(documenting the distribution of citizen videos from Iran to social media sites and 
news organizations). 
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to the viability of informed public discussion.46  Serendipitous ama-
teur image capture can fill some of the lacunae left by the decima-
tion of salaried news staffs.47 
Officials have introduced spontaneously captured images in pub-
lic prosecutions.48  Conversely, police abuse captured by the cameras 
of bystanding videographers, followed by public broadcast of the foot-
age, has become a regular feature of our public life and the under-
pinning of effective demands for redress.49  Spontaneously captured 
 
46 Cf. Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 272-73 (4th Cir. 2009) (Wilkinson, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that First Amendment jurisprudence should be sensitive to the evolving 
state of journalism, as “[t]he verdict is still out on whether the Internet and the online 
ventures of traditional journalistic enterprises can help fill the void left by less com-
prehensive print and network coverage of public business”). 
47 Cf. Paul Harris, The King of Online Gossip Who Became the Scourge of Hollywood, OB-
SERVER (London), Oct. 25, 2009, at 33, available at LEXIS (describing a celebrity news 
site “full of vidoes [sic], taking advantage of its staff, freelancers, tourists and just about 
anyone with a camera phone who happens to spot a famous face”); CNN IREPORT, 
http://ireport.cnn.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (encouraging the CNN audience to 
submit photographs and video on a variety of issues); YOUTUBE DIRECT, http:// 
www.youtube.com/direct (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (making software available to allow 
news organizations to solicit and edit videos from members of the general public). 
48 See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, Three Men Who Had No Reason to Run, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 
2008, at B1 (reporting that a recording by a “freelance videographer” was introduced 
at trial by prosecutors to support their case of police abuse); John Lauinger, Cops Nail 
Subway Pervert, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 14, 2009, at 14, available at 2009 WLNR 15866932 
(detailing the arrest of a suspect after a woman who had been subjected to indecent 
exposure on a New York City subway captured an image of the man on her cell phone 
and provided it to police); Doug Page, Dayton Woman Wanted in Attack with Stiletto Heel, 
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 27, 2010, at A5, available at 2010 WLNR 14946577 (chronicl-
ing the account of a victim attacked by a woman with a stiletto heel and noting that an 
iPhone video of the incident helped police apprehend the suspect); Stewart M. Powell, 
Moussaoui Jury Hears Graphic 9/11 Details, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 7, 2006, at A3, available 
at 2006 WLNR 5901371 (describing prosecution’s presentation of testimony of a “visi-
tor from Washington state, Tamar Rosbrook, who narrated a video that she and her 
husband took of the World Trade Center from their hotel room that showed dozens of 
victims falling toward the ground”). 
49 See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, When Official Truth Collides with Cheap Digital Technology, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 30, 2008, at B1 (describing a YouTube video shot by a tourist that contra-
dicts a police officer’s account of why he shoved a cyclist off his bicycle); John Eligon & 
Colin Moynihan, Police Officer Seen on Tape Shoving a Bicyclist Is Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
16, 2008, at A33 (reporting on the indictment and on a community group’s demands 
that police use less aggressive tactics against bicyclists accused of creating public safety 
hazards); Raj Jayadev, Op-Ed., Much Harder to “Spin” Violence in Web 2.0 Era, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 12, 2009, at 9A, available at 2009 WLNR 627686 (discussing the 
impact of cell phone videos posted on YouTube and aired by local news organizations 
that show a young man being shot to death by a police officer); Meg Coyle, FBI 
Launches Civil Rights Probe into Seattle PD Video, KING5.COM, May 10, 2010, http: 
//www.king5.com/news/FBI-launches-civil-rights-investigation-into-Seattle-PD-video-
93336449.html (detailing the content of a video that shows several police officers phys-
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images from different sources can be combined to generate public in-
formation that could not have been gleaned by any single observer.  
Thus, in the aftermath of the mass arrests at the 2004 Republican Na-
tional Convention in New York City, an activist forensic video analyst 
gathered and collated images of the demonstrations to reveal a robust 
police practice of infiltrating political demonstrations,50 while investi-
gators in London collated amateur videos to lay the basis for prosecut-
ing police abuse during demonstrations in April 2009.51 
III.  PERCEIVED DANGERS AND REGULATORY REACTIONS:   
DARK SIDES AND SHADOWS 
The advent of pervasive image capture brings anxiety as well as 
opportunity.  Most Americans have never believed that photographs 
will steal their souls, but innovations in the technology of image cap-
ture have historically generated a sense of vulnerability and discom-
fort.  The introduction of the portable camera in the late nineteenth 
century provoked unease, along with legal innovations that laid the 
groundwork for the modern law of privacy.52  In the last decade and a 
 
ically and verbally abusing a young man and that later ignited a civil rights investiga-
tion); Mayra Moreno, Teacher Fired After Beating Caught on Camera, 39ONLINE.COM, May 
11, 2010, http://www.39online.com/news/local/kiah-charter-school-student-beaten-
story,0,1079016.story (reporting on the dismissal of a teacher after she was recorded 
on a cell phone camera beating up a student); Alex Veiga, YouTube.com Video Prompts 
Probe of LAPD, USA TODAY, Nov. 13, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-
11-13-youtube-arrest_x.htm (reporting on the posting of a cell phone video on You-
Tube that led to an investigation of police brutality because it captured police officers 
repeatedly punching a suspect as they arrested him). 
50 See Jim Dwyer, New York Police Covertly Join In at Protest Rallies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 
2005, at A1 (describing collection and collation of these images). 
51 Amateur videos played a key role in exposing the police brutality that occurred 
during the London G-20 Summit in April 2009.  Jerome L. Sherman, Ubiquitous Cam-
eras Capture Actions by Police, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 6, 2009, at A15, available 
at 2009 WLNR 17488543.  A New York hedge fund manager filmed an incident in 
which a London police officer “struck . . . and pushed . . . to the ground” a newspaper 
vendor, who died shortly thereafter from the trauma.  Id.   
The Guardian newspaper soon acquired the video, which contradicted police 
statements about [the vendor’s] death.  It pushed Britain’s Independent Po-
lice Complaints Commission to launch one of the largest investigations in the 
commission’s history, relying heavily on video footage captured by people who 
were on the streets of London on April 1 and 2.  
Id. 
52 See, e.g., Robert E. Mensel, “Kodakers Lying in Wait”:  Amateur Photography and the 
Right of Privacy in New York, 1885–1915, 43 AM. Q. 24, 28-41 (1991) (describing the 
spread of inexpensive cameras and widespread distribution of photographs which 
made photography possible for “thousands upon thousands” of amateur photograph-
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half, pervasive image capture has begun to generate a similar sense of 
dislocation and unease.  This concern for a dark side of image capture 
has precipitated legal theories, regulatory strategies, and enforcement 
decisions—theories, strategies, and decisions that cast shadows on the 
practice of image capture and threaten to cripple its promise. 
A.  Proposed Public Privacy Torts 
The original proposal by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis for a 
tort remedy to protect privacy was rooted in late nineteenth-century 
concern over portable cameras and the emerging plebeian press.53  
Over the course of the last century, American common law developed 
a portfolio of “privacy torts” that constrains the capture and dissemi-
nation of images.  Mainstream common law precedent recognizes 
both the tort of intrusion on seclusion and the tort of publication of 
private facts.  Neither applies directly to most digital image capture.  
Intrusion on seclusion provides relief only against images involuntarily 
captured within the target’s own home or in facilities remote from the 
public; publication of private facts is generally held to be inapplicable 
to images voluntarily exposed to the public gaze.54 
Emphasizing the extent of potential surveillance in public areas by 
pervasive image capture and the harms that can attend Internet-
enabled distribution of embarrassing images, contemporary commen-
tators have regularly advocated expanding the privacy tort to encom-
pass nonconsensual image capture in public spaces.  The arguments 
 
ers, and exploring the consequent anxiety and “profound sense of exposure and viola-
tion” among potential unwilling subjects of photography, as well as subsequent legal 
efforts to curb unbridled photography); see also The Right of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
23, 1902, at 8 (discussing the dangers of “‘kodakers’ lying in wait,” the “ordeal of the 
camera,” and the need for a remedy for “these savage and horrible practices”). 
53 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193, 195 (1890) (“Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded 
the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices 
threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be 
proclaimed from the house-tops.’”).  But see Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 
N.E. 442, 443 (N.Y. 1902) (refusing to enjoin publication of advertisements featuring 
unauthorized photographs of the plaintiff because a principle that restrains “publica-
tion of that which purports to be a portrait of another person, even if obtained upon 
the street by an impertinent individual with a camera . . . [would extend to a vast] list 
of things that are spoken and done day by day which seriously offend the sensibilities 
of good people”). 
54 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977) (discussing the doc-
trine of intrusion upon seclusion); id. § 652D cmt. b (examining the doctrine of “pub-
licity given to matters concerning private . . . life”). 
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began with concern about handheld camcorders55 and flourished with 
worries about cell phone cameras.56  Most recently, commentators 
have taken alarm at the emergence of Internet capabilities, arguing 
for the necessity of providing “legal recourse in networked places 
crawling with camera-toting citizen-journalists.”57 
These proposals have not yet begun to bear abundant fruit in case 
law; most reported cases involve either private intrusions into intimate 
situations or media defendants rather than citizen-journalists.  Cases in-
volving surreptitious capture of images in intimate situations have 
found some success.58  But reported cases tend to run aground either 
on the absence of a reasonable expectation of privacy59 or on a news-
 
55 See e.g., Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet:  A Tort Theory 
of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 1021-22 (1995). 
56 E.g., Alan Kato Ku, Comment, Talk Is Cheap, But a Picture Is Worth a Thousand 
Words:  Privacy Rights in the Era of Camera Phone Technology, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 679 
(2005); Aimee Jodoi Lum, Comment, Don’t Smile, Your Image Has Just Been Recorded on a 
Camera-Phone:  The Need for Privacy in the Public Sphere, 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 377 (2005).  
57 Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras and Computers:  The First Amendment and Networked 
Public Places, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1, 46 (2007); see also, e.g., Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting 
Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5-7 (2007); Jacqueline D. Lip-
ton, “We, the Paparazzi”:  Developing a Privacy Paradigm for Digital Video, 95 IOWA L. REV. 
919, passim (2010); Josh Blackman, Student Article, Omniveillance, Google, Privacy in 
Public, and the Right to Your Digital Identity:  A Tort for Recording and Disseminating an Indi-
vidual’s Image over the Internet, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 313, 354-92 (2010).  
58 See, e.g., Doe v. Luster, No. B184508, 2007 WL 2120855, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. July 
25, 2007) (determining that a cause of action existed for distribution of videos of al-
leged rapist committing multiple sexual assaults after drugging victims); In re Marriage 
of Tigges, 758 N.W.2d 824, 830 (Iowa 2008) (finding that a husband who surreptitious-
ly videotaped his wife in their marital bedroom violated the wife’s “reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy”); Lewis v. LeGrow, 670 N.W.2d 675, 680 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (affirm-
ing a jury verdict against a man who secretly videotaped a series of consensual sexual 
encounters with ex-girlfriends).  
59 See, e.g., Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, Inc., 306 F.3d 806, 815 (9th Cir. 
2002) (holding that, under Arizona law, a medical lab owner had no objectively rea-
sonable expectation of privacy when he met with ABC representatives who covertly 
taped the encounter); Deteresa v. ABC, Inc., 121 F.3d 460, 466 (9th Cir. 1997) (hold-
ing that a woman videotaped “in public view from a public place” without her know-
ledge did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy); Hornberger v. ABC, Inc., 799 
A.2d 566, 595 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (holding that police officers had no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy to support their claims of violation of privacy under 
New Jersey’s Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act when a reporter’s 
hidden camera filmed the officers searching a car); cf. J.H. Desnick, M.D., Eye Servs., 
Ltd. v. ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1353 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that use of “test patients” 
with concealed cameras did not violate employees’ privacy rights); People for the Ethi-
cal Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1281 (Nev. 1995) 
(holding that a backstage video recording of an animal trainer did not violate a train-
er’s privacy right because the recording did not interfere with the trainer’s expected 
privacy).  But cf. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 524 (4th Cir. 
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worthiness defense.60  Still, with the continued spread of pervasive image 
capture, efforts to impose common law liability are unlikely to abate. 
B.  Legislative Initiatives Directed at Image Capture 
Legislative initiatives aimed at the perceived dangers of the 
emerging digital visual ecology have been less restrained.  California 
has adopted several waves of antipaparazzi statutes attempting to limit 
capture of celebrity images.61  Localities have banned the use of cell 
phone cameras in public restrooms and have proposed prohibiting 
the use of cell phone cameras near ATM sites.62 
The last decade and a half has brought the unpleasant phenome-
non of “upskirt photography,” in which images of pudenda and un-
dergarments are captured in public locations by means of aggressive 
digital photography.  These images, and others captured surrep-
titiously in a variety of venues, have come to be posted on a burgeon-
 
1999) (affirming judgment against employees for breach of loyalty when employees 
used hidden cameras to film employer’s food handling practices); Turnbull v. Am. 
Broad. Cos., No. 03-3554, 2004 WL 2924590, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2004) (sustain-
ing cause of action for secretly filming a casting workshop); Sanders v. ABC, Inc., 978 
P.2d 67, 71 (Cal. 1999) (sustaining cause of action for invasion of privacy against a re-
porter for posing as a coworker and secretly recording conversations); Special Force 
Ministries v. WCCO Television, 584 N.W.2d 789, 792-95 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (sus-
taining action for trespass and fraud against a television station after a station em-
ployee posed as a volunteer and secretly videotaped activities in the facility for use in a 
news story). 
60 See, e.g., Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d 1228, 1236 (10th Cir. 2007) (sustaining 
newsworthiness defense of television station’s broadcast of videotape showing accused 
rapist’s assault on unconscious victim); Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 
1223-25 (10th Cir. 2007) (sustaining newsworthiness defense of broadcast of images of 
undercover police officer accused of abuse); Lee v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., No. 96-7069, 
1997 WL 33384309, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 1997) (sustaining newsworthiness defense 
in publication of celebrities’ private honeymoon photographs).  But see, e.g., Y.G. v. 
Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488, 501 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that plain-
tiffs’ privacy interests outweighed station’s interest in publicizing newsworthy events 
after plaintiffs were filmed at a gathering of in vitro fertilization participants). 
61 See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501, 1528 (2009) (describing the “constructive invasion of pri-
vacy” tort, which provides a remedy against the use of a “‘visual or auditory enhanc-
ing device’ . . . ‘regardless of whether there is a physical trespass’” (quoting CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1708.8(b) (West 2009))); see also Richardson-Tunnell v. Schs. Ins. Program 
for Empls. (SIPE), 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 176, 183 (Ct. App. 2007) (explaining the history 
of § 1708.8). 
62 Ku, supra note 56, at 691-92 (describing enacted and considered local bans on 
cell phone cameras in certain public places). 
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ing variety of pornographic websites.63  In response, legislatures 
around the country have promulgated statutes prohibiting “video 
voyeurism.”64  An early initiative in Tennessee made it an offense 
for a person to knowingly photograph, or cause to be photographed an 
individual, when such individual is in a place where there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, without the prior effective consent of the individ-
ual . . . if such photograph: 
1) Would offend or embarrass an ordinary person if such person 
appeared in the photograph; and 
2) Was taken for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of 
the defendant.
65  
The federal version, adopted a decade later, applies in the special mari-
time and territorial jurisdiction of the United States to punish an indi-
vidual who has “the intent to capture an image of a private area of an 
individual without their consent, and knowingly does so under circums-
tances in which the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.”66 
Many applications of these video voyeurism statutes have prosecuted 
image capture that would be considered abusive under almost any stan-
dard.67  But the more broadly written statutes constrain the capture of 
 
63 See, e.g., Clay Calvert & Justin Brown, Video Voyeurism, Privacy, and the Internet:  
Exposing Peeping Toms in Cyberspace, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 469, 499 (2000). 
64 Early articles advocating such statutes include Calvert & Brown, id., Maria Pope, 
Technology Arms Peeping Toms with a New and Dangerous Arsenal:  A Compelling Need for 
States to Adopt New Legislation, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1167 (1999), and 
Lance E. Rothenberg, Student Article, Re-thinking Privacy:  Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs, 
and the Failure of Criminal Law to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Public 
Space, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1127 (2000). 
65 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-605 (Supp. 2001). 
66 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006).  For a recent survey of “video voyeurism” statutes, see 
Timothy J. Horstmann, Comment, Protecting Traditional Privacy Rights in a Brave New Digi-
tal World:  The Threat Posed by Cellular Phone-Cameras and What States Should Do to Stop It, 111 
PENN ST. L. REV. 739, 739-41 (2007).  See also Video Voyeurism Laws, NAT’L CTR. FOR VIC-
TIMS OF CRIME, http://www.ncvc.org/src/AGP.Net/Components/DocumentViewer/ 
Download.aspxnz?DocumentID=37716 (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (listing states with 
“video voyeurism” statutes).  
67 E.g., People v. Hobbs, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 685, 687 (Ct. App. 2007) (“[D]efendant 
snuck into the girls’ locker room . . . set up a video camera so he could film [un-
seen] . . . [and] filmed at least 45 girls who were competing in the swim meet as they 
changed into and out of their bathing suits.”); State v. Schaller, 08-0522, p. 15-16 (La. 
App. 5 Cir. 5/26/09); 15 So. 3d 1046, 1055-56 (defendant secretly videotaped the sex-
ual acts between a teenage girl and her boyfriend); State v. Huffman, 165 Ohio App. 
3d 518, 2006-Ohio-1106, 847 N.E.2d 58, at ¶¶ 1-6 (defendant installed a hidden cam-
era in a tanning room). 
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images that carry considerably more claim to protection,68 and aggressive 
officials have been inclined to stretch the statutes even further.69 
The recent moral panic regarding sexting has produced similar re-
sults.  Alarmed prosecutors have invoked child pornography and ob-
scenity statutes to prosecute minors who capture or transmit nude or 
provocative images of themselves.70  Legislators dissatisfied with existing 
statutes have begun to draft statutes directed specifically at the practice.71 
Recent foreign legislation has targeted potentially harmful image 
capture even more aggressively.  New British criminal statutes could 
be used to prohibit photographs of police officers that are “likely to 
be useful” to terrorists.72  Confronted with the disturbing fad of “hap-
py slapping,” in which assaults are perpetrated in order to capture and 
distribute images of the attacks, French law now forbids “recording or 
 
68 See, e.g., State v. Stevenson, 2000 WI 71, ¶¶ 21-22, 236 Wis. 2d 86, 613 N.W.2d 90 
(invalidating a statute for overbreadth because it could apply to newsworthy images 
and political satire); cf. State v. Reep, 167 P.3d 1156, 1157-58 (Wash. 2007) (consider-
ing prosecution for images of children sitting on trampolines taken from the defen-
dant’s bedroom window). 
69 See, e.g., Griesinger v. Loveland City Sch. Dist., No. 06-0569, 2007 WL 433298, at 
*1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2007) (recounting a prosecution for voyeurism when plaintiff 
complained about the inappropriate attire of a high school dance-team manager and 
e-mailed three still pictures from a videotape of a dance team performance to respon-
sible school administrators); Allen Gwinn, Photographer Arrest Tossed; D.A. Apologizes For 
Southlake Police Behavior, DALLAS.ORG, Nov. 1, 2005, http://www.dallas.org/node/97 
(reporting the improper arrest of a photographer for taking pictures at Oktoberfest); 
Darius Radzius, Man Arrested for Unlawful Photography, TRICITIES.COM, July 12, 2008, 
http://www.tricities.com/news/2008/jul/12/man_arrested_for_unlawful_photograph
y-ar-254606 (reporting the arrest for “unlawful photography” of a citizen who took a 
picture of a police officer during a traffic stop). 
70 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (discussing the rise of sexting); see 
also, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So.2d 234, 235-36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (affirming the 
adjudication of delinquency for child pornography of a sixteen-year-old girl who had 
taken 117 digital photos of herself and her seventeen-year-old boyfriend “naked and 
engaged in sexual behavior” and e-mailed the images to her home computer); State v. 
A.R.S., 684 So.2d 1383, 1384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam) (reversing the 
dismissal of child pornography charges against a fifteen-year-old boy who videotaped 
himself and a younger female “engaged in nude, sexual foreplay” and then played the 
tape for a friend); State v. D.H., 9 P.3d 253, 254 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding the 
“sexual exploitation of a minor” conviction of a fifteen-year-old boy who brought a vid-
eo camera to high school and persuaded three of his fifteen-year-old classmates to ex-
pose their breasts for the camera). 
71 See 2009 “Sexting” Legislation:  Year-end Summary, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATORS 
(revised Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=17756 (listing states that 
introduced “sexting” legislation in 2009 and discusing the goals of these statutes). 
72 See Olivier Laurent, Jail for Photographing Police?, BRIT. J. PHOTOGRAPHY, Jan. 28, 
2009, at 4 (describing the increased police power to prevent photography under the 
Counter-Terrorism Act of 2008). 
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distributing images of violent crime” by individuals who are not pro-
fessional journalists.73 
C.  Wiretapping Statutes, Open-Textured Prohibitions, and Official Fiat 
Police, like many civilians, are often camera-shy.  Officers dislike 
being recorded in embarrassing situations and may be concerned that 
dissemination of their images may put them at risk of retaliation.74  
They are accustomed, as well, to substantial deference in the construc-
tion of official narratives,75 and many would prefer to be in a position 
to shape perceptions of their actions without competing digital 
records.  Police officers often view private digital image capture as a 
challenge to their authority. 
As a result, the spread of pervasive image capture in the last dec-
ade has been accompanied by a rich set of cases in which police have 
sought to prosecute critics or potential critics who capture their im-
ages.  In these cases, police officers and other officials have enlisted 
both existing statutes and creative prosecutorial discretion in the 
struggle to constrain inconvenient image capture. 
 
73 Adam Sage, Happy-Slapping Film Ban ‘Will Gag Citizen Journalists,’ TIMES (London), 
Mar. 9, 2007, at 43 (quoting the French law) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Peter Sayer, France Bans Citizen Journalists from Reporting Violence, MACWORLD (Mar. 6, 2007, 
3:00 AM), http://www.macworld.com/article/56615/2007/03/franceban.html (“The law 
could lead to the imprisonment of eyewitnesses who film acts of police violence, or op-
erators of web sites publishing the images . . . .”); New Prevention of Criminality Law Poses 
Threat to Citizen Reporting, REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRES (Mar. 8, 2007), http://en. 
rsf.org/IMG/article_PDF/france-new-prevention-of-criminality-law-08-03-2007,21237.pdf 
(reporting the potential implications of the ban). 
74 Cf. Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 2007) (remark-
ing on “the difficult and potentially dangerous situation undercover officers face after 
having their identities revealed to the public”); Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155, 158 
(11th Cir. 1995) (observing that photographs could be useful in carrying out death 
threats against officers and that “criminal organizations prize photographs of under-
cover officers”).  
75 E.g., CITY OF NEW YORK COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE COR-
RUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T, COMM’N RE-
PORT 36 (1994), available at http://www.parc.info/client_files/special%20Reports/ 
4%20-%20Mollen%20Commission%20-%20NYPD.pdf (identifying incidence of police 
perjury in New York sufficiently common to coin the broadly current neologism “testi-
lying”).  For other discussion of “testilying,” see, for example, I. Bennett Capers, Crime, 
Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835 (2008); Morgan Cloud, Judges, “Testilying,” 
and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341 (1996); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying:  
Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037 (1996).  
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1.  Wiretapping Statutes 
Many state statutes originally drafted to regulate wiretapping pro-
hibit more generally the recording or interception of oral communi-
cations unless all parties to the conversation consent.76  Police officers 
regularly rely on these statutes to arrest citizens who insist on record-
ing the officers without their consent, often after the citizens have 
used the records to file complaints against the police.77  Some states 
have construed their statutes to preclude such prosecutions on the 
ground that exercises of public authority by police officers cannot by 
 
76 See Carol M. Bast, What’s Bugging You?  Inconsistencies and Irrationalities of the Law of 
Eavesdropping, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 837, 868, 869 & n.313, 870-81, app. C (1998) (discuss-
ing consent requirements in state eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes and enume-
rating eleven states that prohibit single-party-consent recordings); Diane Leenheer 
Zimmerman, I Spy:  The Newsgatherer Under Cover, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1185, 1215, 1216 & 
n.139, 1217 (2000) (identifying thirteen states requiring both parties to consent to a 
recorded conversation).  
 Some statutes also prohibit the capture of visual images.  See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 22-21-1 (1988); see also People v. Gibbons, 263 Cal. Rptr. 905, 908-09 (Ct. App. 
1989) (interpreting a statute punishing nonconsenual recording of confidential 
“communications” to reach videotaping of expressive conduct in sexual encounters); 
cf. THE REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, Can We Tape? (2008), http:// 
www.rcfp.org/taping/index.html (“At least 24 states have laws outlawing certain uses 
of hidden cameras in private places . . . .”). 
77 See, e.g., Kat Kanning, SPCA Joins the Police State, N.H. FREE PRESS, Nov. 2008, at 8 
(describing the arrest of Cooper Travis “at his home in Candia, New Hampshire for refus-
ing to turn off his video camera while speaking with a police officer”); Annys Shin, From 
YouTube to Your Local Court, WASH. POST, June 16, 2010, at A1 (describing an early-morning 
raid and wiretapping prosecution of Anthony Graber, who had posted on YouTube his 
helmet-camera video of a police officer who had stopped his motorcycle for speeding);  
Andrew Wolfe, Vindication: Police Drop Wiretap Charges, NASHUA TEL., Aug. 5, 2006, at 1 (de-
scribing the arrest of Michael Gannon after his home security camera videotaped conver-
sations with New Hampshire detectives at his door and after he took the videotape to po-
lice headquarters to complain about harassment, though the case was later dropped); Jon 
Yates, Rights, Eavesdropping Law Collide in Filmmakers’ Case, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 7, 2004, § 2, at 1 
(describing freelance documentary filmmakers who had videotaped traffic stops:  
“[P]olice seized Miller’s video camera. . . . [Filmmakers] submitted [the] documentary to 
Urbana Public Television, prosecutors confiscated that, too, and charged the two with ea-
vesdropping . . . .”); Derrick Blakely, Artist Charged for Eavesdropping During His Arrest, 
CBS2CHICAGO.COM, Jan. 29, 2010, http://cbs2chicago.com/local/artist.chris.drew.2. 
1458494.html (recounting felony prosecution of a street vendor for recording police of-
ficers without their consent); Mary Schenk, Eavesdropping Charges Dismissed, NEWS-
GAZETTE (Champaign), Dec. 2, 2004, http://www.news-gazette.com/news/local/2004/ 
-12/-02/eavesdropping_charges_dismissed (describing the decision of Champaign County 
State’s Attorney to drop charges against members of a “community watchdog group”); 
Ray Sanchez, Growing Number of Prosecutions for Videotaping the Police, ABCNEWS.COM, 
July 19, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/US/TheLaw/videotaping-cops-arrest/story?id= 
11179076 (describing Graber’s arrest in Maryland for videotaping police, as well as arrests 
in Florida and New Hampshire).  For other examples, see infra notes 78-95.   
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their nature support an expectation of privacy.  The state of Washing-
ton has been clearest on this point, refusing to “transform the privacy 
act into a sword available for use against individuals by public officers 
acting in their official capacity.”78  Pennsylvania case law similarly ex-
cludes recordings of law enforcement officials’ exercise of official au-
thority in public settings from the consent requirement because offi-
cials lack the legitimate expectation of privacy required for statutory 
protection.79  And a Maryland judge recently rebuffed efforts to prose-
cute an inconvenient videographer under the state wiretap statute, 
 
78 State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); see also Johnson v. 
Hawe, 388 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Flora and ruling that police officers do 
not have an expectation of privacy when performing an official function on a public 
thoroughfare); Alford v. Haner, 333 F.3d 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Flora and not-
ing that “[t]ape recording officers conducting a traffic stop is not a crime in Washing-
ton”), rev’d on other grounds, Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004); Lewis v. Dep’t of 
Licensing, 139 P.3d 1078, 1084 (Wash. 2006) (citing Alford and Flora with approval and 
holding that “traffic stop conversations are not private for purposes of the privacy act”). 
 New Jersey courts have held that police officers could assert no Wiretap Act claim 
against media “testers”—minorities hired by news outlets to drive expensive cars—who 
recorded their racial profiling in a highway stop.  See Hornberger v. ABC, Inc., 799 
A.2d 566, 594-95 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2002) (concluding that police did not have an expec-
tation of privacy during a traffic stop filmed through an arrangement with ABC); see 
also Angel v. Williams, 12 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting a wiretap claim by 
police officers who alleged that an audio recording of an incident in which the officers 
were accused of using excessive force on a prisoner constituted an unlawful intercep-
tion of private communication). 
79 See, e.g., Agnew v. Dupler, 717 A.2d 519, 523-24 (Pa. 1998) (finding no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy for police conversations conducted in the squad room, 
which could be overheard without amplification); Commonwealth v. Henlen, 564 A.2d 
905, 907 (Pa. 1989) (holding that a suspect interviewed by a state trooper who submit-
ted a recorded interview in a complaint against a state trooper could not be prosecuted 
for violating the Wiretap Act). 
 Pennsylvania police officers, however, continue to invoke the wiretap statute 
against those who antagonize them by recording them.  See, e.g., Kelly v. Borough of 
Carlisle, No. 09-2644, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 20430, at *22 (3d Cir. Oct. 4, 2010) (“[A]t 
the time of Kelly’s arrest, it was clearly established that a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy was a prerequisite for a Wiretap Act violation.  Even more to the point, two Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court cases—one almost 20 years old at the time of Kelly’s arrest—
had held that covertly recording police officers was not a violation of the Act.  Finally, 
it was also clearly established that police officers do not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy when recording conversations with suspects.”); Matheny v. County of Alleg-
heny, No. 09-1070, 2010 WL 1007859, at *6-7 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2010) (granting quali-
fied immunity for police officers who arrested an activist on wiretap charges for the 
video recording of a friend’s detention despite later dismissal of charges); cf. Paula 
Reed Ward, DA’s Office Agrees to Unusual Settlement, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, July 15, 
2010, at B1, available at 2010 WLNR 14156921 (describing the agreement of the Dis-
trict Attorney’s office in Matheny to distribute legal memorandum concluding that re-
cording police in public does not violate Wiretap Act).  Readers should be aware that I 
serve as counsel to the team that represents the plaintiff in Matheny. 
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commenting that “[i]n this rapid information technology era in which 
we live, it is hard to imagine that either an offender or an officer 
would have any reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to what 
is said between them in a traffic stop on a public highway.”80 
Other states, however, have upheld prosecutions of citizens who 
record police in the exercise of their duties.  The leading case is 
Commonwealth v. Hyde,81 in which the defendant tape-recorded a traf-
fic stop during which he contended that he was harassed because of 
his long hair.  When Hyde went to the police station to file a formal 
complaint and submitted the tape recording as substantiation, he 
was arrested, prosecuted, and convicted under the Massachusetts 
Wiretap Act on the ground that he had not obtained the consent of 
the arresting officers.82  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts affirmed the conviction and concluded that “the Legislature 
intended . . . strictly to prohibit all secret recordings by members of 
the public, including recordings of police officers or other public offi-
cials interacting with members of the public, when made without their 
permission or knowledge.”83  In the aftermath of Hyde, Massachusetts 
police officers invoked the wiretapping statute to arrest bystanders 
who recorded arrests on cell phones.84  Massachusetts courts have 
 
80 State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *17 (Sept. 27, 
2010).  The judge continued, “Those of us who are public officials and are entrusted 
with the power of the state are ultimately accountable to the public.  When we exercise 
that power in public fora, we should not expect our actions to be shielded from public 
observation.  Sed quis custodiet ipsos cutodes [sic].”  Id. at *35 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
81 Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963 (Mass. 2001).  For adverse commen-
tary on Hyde, see, for example, Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision:  Video and the 
Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 649-52 (2009).  See also id. (“It is 
inconsistent with democracy and democratic political accountability for government 
officials to have protectable privacy interests when performing official functions . . . .”); 
Dina Mishra, Comment, Undermining Excessive Privacy for Police:  Citizen Tape Recording to 
Check Police Officers’ Power, 117 YALE L.J. 1549, 1551-55 (2008) (arguing that citizen re-
cordings provide a valuable external check on police corruption and that current pro-
tections against abuse are insufficient). 
82 Hyde, 750 N.E. 2d at 964-65. 
83 Id. at 967. 
84 See Daniel Rowinski, Police Fight Cell Phone Recordings:  Witnesses Taking Audio of 
Officers Arrested, Charged with Illegal Surveillance, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 12, 2010, at 1, available 
at 2010 WLNR 610060 (describing arrests in Massachusetts of civilians recording police 
officers in 2007 and 2008); Harvey Silverglate & James Tierney, Echoes of Rodney King, 
BOS. PHOENIX, Feb. 21, 2008, available at http://thephoenix.com/boston/News/ 
56680-Echoes-of-Rodney-King (recounting arrest of Simon Glik, who “used his cell 
phone to record Boston police officers making what he thought was an overly forceful 
arrest”); cf. Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2007) (enjoining po-
lice officers from interfering with Internet publication of images of a warrantless police 
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upheld the conviction of a freelance journalist who photographed and 
tape-recorded police officers at a political rally,85 and refused to dismiss 
a cause of action against a defendant who “[d]uring his arrest, transport 
and booking . . . secretly tape recorded the entire incident.”86  In Illi-
nois, where legislation was amended to target the recording of police 
officers,87 the ACLU brought suit to invalidate the ban, although the 
suit was recently dismissed for lack of standing.88 
Many states have not yet resolved the application of their wiretap 
prohibitions to distributed image capture.  In situations where there is 
doubt about state law, courts have allowed arresting officers who seek 
to suppress image capture and distribution to invoke qualified im-
munity to shield their arrests from subsequent damage actions.89 
2.  Catchall Statutes:  Interference, Disobedience, and  
Disorderly Conduct 
Where wiretap prohibitions do not apply, officers faced with de-
fiant videographers frequently turn to broader criminal statutes that 
provide substantial enforcement discretion.  In recent years, police of-
ficers in Philadelphia arrested a man who filmed the arrest of his 
neighbor on a cell phone for “obstructing an investigation.”90  Police 
 
search and arrest recorded on “nanny-cam,” but suggesting that the capture of images 
could be subject to prosecution in cases where the “government interests in preserving 
privacy and deterring illegal interceptions” are more compelling). 
85 Commonwealth v. Manzelli, 864 N.E.2d 566, 568 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). 
86 Gouin v. Gouin, 249 F. Supp. 2d 62, 79 (D. Mass. 2003) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
87 Compare People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346, 350 (Ill. 1986) (holding that a 
wiretap statute did not forbid recording police officers), with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN.  5/14-1(d) (West Supp. 2009) (superseding Beardsley, and defining “conversa-
tion” as “any oral communication . . . regardless of whether one or more of the parties 
intended their communication to be of a private nature”). 
88 ACLU v. Alvarez, No. 10-5235, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 115354, at *6, *11 (N.D. Ill. 
Oct. 28, 2010); see also Becky Schlikerman & Kristen Mack, ACLU Challenges State’s Eaves-
dropping Law, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 20, 2010, at 1, available at 2010 WLNR 16605495 (de-
scribing the ACLU’s legal action).  
89 See, e.g., Skoog v. County of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1225, 1235 (9th Cir. 
2006) (granting qualified immunity to an officer for seizure of the plaintiff’s camera 
and arrest of the plaintiff for filming the officer and “juvenile ‘decoy’” seeking to pur-
chase tobacco). 
90 Cell Phone Picture Called Obstruction of Justice:  Man Arrested for Shooting Photo of Po-
lice Activity, NBC10.COM, July 25, 2006 (quoting the photographer’s mother) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), http://web.archive.org/web/20060821200354/http:// 
www.nbc10.com/news/9574663/detail.html.  Creatively, the police also told the sus-
pect “that he broke a[n imaginary] new law that prohibits people from taking pictures 
of police with cell phones.”  Id.; cf. Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155, 157-59 (11th Cir. 
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in St. Louis arrested a photographer for “interfering” with an officer 
when she recorded a police arrest of protesters at a health care rally.91  
Similar charges resulted in arrests of photographers at crime scenes 
and fires in Illinois, Arkansas, and Louisiana.92 
A student photographer in State College, Pennsylvania who re-
fused to cease photographing a riot faced trial for failure to obey an 
officer,93 while a freelance photographer in Miami who insisted on 
filming an arrest was acquitted of disorderly conduct and disobeying 
an officer, but convicted of resisting arrest and obstructing a street.94  
Other police officers offended by citizens recording their activities have 
recently arrested private videographers on charges of harassment.95 
 
1995) (reversing the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to a law enforcement 
officer who arrested, and seized the film of, a demonstration participant for photo-
graphing undercover officers). 
91 Dueling Protesters Disrupt Carnahan Forum on Aging, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Aug. 7, 2009, at A1.  
92 See David Heinzmann, Photographer Finds Himself in Hot Water with Police, CHI. 
TRIB., Nov. 20, 2008, at 26, available at 2008 WLNR 22140824 (discussing two separate 
arrests of a freelance photographer in Chicago); Stacy Hudson, Maumelle Reporter 
Cleared of Charges, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Dec. 16, 2007, at 9, available at Facti-
va, Doc. No. AKDG000020071217e3cg0004c (discussing the arrest of a reporter who 
took a picture of a house fire in Little Rock, though the charges were later dropped); 
Sonia Smith, Photographer Arrested at Crime Scene, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Jan. 18, 2009, 
at B2 (detailing the arrest of a photographer at a crime scene in Baton Rouge for inter-
fering with a homicide investigation). 
93 Heather Schmelzlen, Photographer Receives Misdemeanor Charges, THE DAILY 
COLLEGIAN, Nov. 7, 2008, http://www.collegian.psu.edu/archive/2008/11/07/ 
photographer_receives_misdemea.aspx. 
94 See Press Release, Society of Professional Journalists, SPJ Leaders Express Disap-
pointment in First Amendment Violation in Miami ( June 19, 2008), available at 
http://www.spj.org/news.asp?REF=812#812; see also Tarus v. Borough of Pine Hill, 
916 A.2d 1036, 1042-44 (N.J. 2007) (discussing the arrest for disorderly conduct of a 
resident who refused to cease filming a public meeting); Special Officer Suspended After 
Arrest of Cameraman, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, Oct. 28, 2008, http://www. 
firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=20796 (describing the suspension of an of-
ficer in Newark, New Jersey, for arresting a television cameraman for disorderly con-
duct for filming a demonstration); Carlos Miller, Homeland Security Cop Arrests Man for 
Filming FBI Building in NYC, PHOTOGRAPHY IS NOT A CRIME, PIXIQ (Aug. 20, 2009, 
1:59 AM), http://carlosmiller.com/2009/08/20/homeland-security-arrests-man-for-
filming-fbi-building-in-nyc/ (discussing a photographer who was arrested for “disorder-
ly conduct, failure to comply and impeding duties of a federal officer” and whose cam-
era was seized for taking photos of an FBI building); Search and Seizure Warrant, In Re 
Search of a Silver and Black Aiptek Handheld Video Camera Serial No. BMC70155393 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2009), available at http://carlosmiller.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2009/08/randallthomas.pdf (arrest and search warrant). 
95 See, e.g., Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (dis-
cussing the arrest of a private videographer who filmed state troopers on a public 
highway on charges of harassment); Complaint at 1-2, Hookway v. E. Vincent Twp., 
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3.  Fiat:  The “Crime” of Photographic Defiance of Authority 
In the absence of viable charges under established criminal law, 
offended police officers frequently have baldly demanded that photo-
graphers cease their activities and surrender captured images; those 
who fail to comply with official fiat are subjected to arrest.96  Thus, in 
Houston, authorities recently agreed to a $1.7 million settlement of a 
lawsuit initiated by Erik and Sean Ibarra, who were arrested in 2002 at 
their home for photographing a sheriff department’s drug raid at a 
neighbor’s home and videotaping the subsequent struggle as sheriffs’ 
deputies pursued the Ibarra brothers into their home to destroy the 
images.97  Although the former district attorney for the county later 
acknowledged that taking photos of officers “is not, per se, illegal,” the 
sheriff’s department maintains that the deputies acted appropriately.98 
Police in Seattle settled a case for the arrest of Bogdan Mohora, 
an amateur photographer who was taking pictures of scenery when he 
captured images of an arrest on a public street and refused to relin-
quish the photos to the pictured officers.  He was released when no 
charges against him could be substantiated.99  Similarly, a press photo-
 
No. 08-05821 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2008) (complaint against police who arrested a video-
grapher); see also Tim Eberly, Man Is Cleared to Record Police, THE FRESNO BEE, June 6, 
2006, at B1, available at 2006 WLNR 9703080 (reporting the dismissal of a police ef-
fort to enjoin a private videographer for harassment, and the imposition of attorneys’ 
fees on the city); Reedley Drops Case Against Cop Watcher, KFSN-TV, Mar. 8, 2006, up-
dated Mar. 23, 2006, http://abclocal.go.com/kfsn/story?section=news/local&id= 
3975295 (discussing the charges against an activist who videotapes police and posts 
videos on “Copwatch” blog). 
96 See, e.g., Sean Gardiner, Shoot First, Hand Over Film Later, VILLAGE VOICE (New 
York), June 11–17, 2008, at 9 (reporting an incident in which police demanded that a 
commercial photographer hand over film that he shot in public on Coney Island).  For 
ongoing documentation of examples of harassment of photographers in public, see 
links at Carlos Miller, Photography Is Not a Crime, PIXIQ, http://carlosmiller.com (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2010).  
97 Peggy O’Hare et al., County Settles with Ibarras for $1.7 Million, HOUS. CHRON., 
Mar. 4, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 4321540. 
98 Peggy O’Hare, Ex-DA Takes Stand in Trial, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 27, 2008, at B1 
(internal quotation marks omitted), available at 2008 WLNR 3846533; see also O’Hare, 
supra note 97, at A1 (reporting that the sheriff did “not see where his deputies did any-
thing blatantly wrong”); cf. Dan McKay, Officer Contests Firing over Attack, ALBUQUERQUE 
J., Jan. 7, 2009, at C2, available at LEXIS (discussing a case in which police officer Da-
niel Guzman “had been caught on camera sizing up, then lunging at veteran KOB-TV 
cameraman Rick Foley”). 
99 Scott Gutierrez, Photographer Gets $8000 for Wrongful-Arrest Claim, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 13, 2007, at B2, available at 2007 WLNR 22586931.  The Seattle po-
lice department subsequently issued a policy that “clearly reminds officers that bystanders 
have a right to watch or film officers making an arrest.”  Scott Gutierrez, Policy Clarifies 
Bystanders’ Rights in Police Incidents, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 5, 2008, at 
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grapher who was arrested and then released after taking photographs 
at the 2008 Republican National Convention in Minneapolis reports 
hearing the arresting officer inquire, after tackling him and tying his 
hands, “What do we charge him with?”100 
Since September 11, a number of governmental agencies have 
promulgated warnings that photography of public locations could be 
a precursor to terrorist attacks.101  As these concerns collide with the 
 
B3.  The policy apparently has been less than fully internalized.  See Sabra Gertsch, 
Cell Phone Snapshot Lands Man in Jail, KOMONEWS.COM, May 14, 2009, http:// 
www.komonews.com/news/45065832.html (describing a twenty-nine-year-old who was 
detained, handcuffed, and arrested after taking a photo of armored car guards opening 
an ATM machine); see also Photographer, Rick Dembow Begins Trial and Lawsuit Against City of 
New York and NYPD, NAT’L PRESS PHOTOGRAPHERS ASS’N (Jan. 2009), http:// 
www.nppa2.org/2009_archives/0109_archives.html#rick_dembow (“As Rick Dembow 
attempted to photograph the arrest of Peter Foley an [NYPD] officer was instructed to 
arrest and handcuff Dembow.”); Rafael Martínez Alequín, NYPD Pix the Wrong Guy, YOUR 
FREE PRESS (Feb. 18, 2009, 5:16 PM), http://yourfreepress.blogspot.com/2009/02/nypd-
pix-wrong-guy.html (discussing the settlement of the Dembow case for $45,000). 
100 David Brauer, AP Photographer’s Last Pre-arrest Shot Is a Stunner, MINNEAPOLIS 
POST, Sept. 3, 2008 (internal quotation marks omitted), http://www.minnpost.com/ 
stories/2008/09/03/3320/ap_photographers_last_pre-arrest_shot_is_a_stunner.  Air-
line officials have demonstrated a similar sense of entitlement.  See Aaron Royster, 
Woman Detained by Airline over Video, KINGMAN DAILY MINER, Aug. 7, 2008, http:// 
www.kingmandailyminer.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&subsectionID=1&articleID=16860 
(describing the arrest of an airline passenger who refused to delete video of an in-flight 
argument between passengers upon demand of the flight attendant). 
101 See, e.g., INFO. SHARING ENV’T, INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT (ISE) 
FUNCTIONAL STANDARD (FS) SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTING (SAR) VERSION 1.5, at 
29 & n.11 (2009), available at http://www.niem.gov/pdf/ISE-FS-200_ISE-SAR_ 
Functional_Standard_V1_5_Issued.pdf (suggesting investigation and reporting of the 
“[t]aking [of] pictures or video of facilities, buildings, or infrastructure in a manner 
that would arouse suspicion in a reasonable person,” but observing in a footnote that 
such activities are generally “First Amendment-protected activities”); Bianca Phillips, 
Tourist or Terrorist?, MEMPHIS FLYER, Apr. 3, 2008, at 9, available at 2008 WLNR 7466117 
(quoting an official of the Tennessee Fusion Center as saying “[y]ou may think a guy is 
just shooting pictures, but if you report it to us, we’ll send it on to the FBI” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Report Suspicious Activity, COLO. INFO. ANALYSIS CTR., 
https://www.ciac.co.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=main.incident (last visited Oct.15, 
2010) (seeking reports of “the use of cameras, note taking, drawing diagrams, [or] an-
notating on maps” as one of the “Eight Signs of Terrorism”); see generally Letter from 
Ronald A. Jackson, Ass’t Gen. Counsel for Operations, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., to Arthur 
B. Spitzer, Legal Dir. A.C.L.U. of the Nat’l Capital Area (Aug. 19, 2009), available at 
http://transportation.house.gov/Media/fileEconomics%20Development/20090923/
McCann%20Testimony.pdf (discussing the policy regarding photography of Department 
of Transportation buildings); Special Security Bulletin, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Pho-
tography of Federally Owned and Leased Facilities (Nov. 10, 2004), available at 
http://transportation.house.gov/Media/file/Economic%20Development/20090923/
McCann%20Testimony.pdf (outlining guidelines regarding photography of federal 
facilities); Transportation Walk Photographer Harassment (Near National’s Park), FLICKR 
(Apr. 15, 2009, 8:45 AM), http://www.flickr.com/groups/dcphotorights/discuss/ 
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spread of digital photography, baseless arrests of landscape photo-
graphers on suspicion of terrorism have proliferated. 
New York City has been the epicenter of the phenomenon.  Photo-
graphers have been arrested or required to relinquish their images for 
taking photographs near landmarks and subway stations102 and for 
photographing trains.103  Amtrak police arrested a New York photo-
grapher for capturing images in order to participate in an Amtrak-
sponsored photography contest.104  The Department of Homeland Se-
curity recently settled a case arising out of an arrest for photographing 
the exterior of a New York federal courthouse; the plaintiff recovered 
damages, and the Federal Protective Service agreed to issue a directive 
 
72157616811370838 (discussing incidents in which photographers were prevented from 
capturing images of Department of Transportation buildings).  
102 Graduate student Arun Wiita was detained while taking pictures near a sub-
way station, and movie maker Rakesh Sharma was detained while filming taxis in 
Manhattan.  See Edith Honan, New York City Sued for Harassing Photographers, REU-
TERS, Dec. 6, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/ 
idUSN0625091620071206.  Both photographers sued and both cases were ultimately 
settled.  See Indian Filmmaker Wins NY Lawsuit, INDIAN EXPRESS (May 25, 2007) 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/indian-filmmaker-wins-ny-lawsuit/31794 (detail-
ing the settlement of the Sharma case for damages and agreement to adopt new rules 
regarding photography of public places); Interview by Jen Carlson with Arun Wiita, GO-
THAMIST ( June 19, 2009), http://gothamist.com/2009/06/19/arun_wilta_subway_ 
project_1.php (describing the settlement of the Wiita case for damages).  
103 See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, No Photo Ban in Subways, Yet an Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 
2009, at A21 (describing the arrest of Robert Taylor for photographing subway trains, 
with police spokesman stating that “officers misinterpreted the rules concerning pho-
tography,” but “will press on with charges of impeding traffic and unreasonable noise” 
(quoting Paul J. Browne, NYPD chief spokesman) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); Daryl Lang, No Photo Ban, But Photogs Still Getting Hassled over Transit Shots, PHO-
TO DISTRICT NEWS (Mar. 17, 2006), http://www.pdnonline.com/pdn/esearch/ 
article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1002199058 (describing harassment by transit po-
lice intended to stop photographers from taking pictures of the Long Island Railroad). 
104 Carlos Miller, Amtrak Photo Contestant Arrested by Amtrak Police in NYC’s Penn Sta-
tion, PHOTOGRAPHY IS NOT A CRIME (Dec. 27, 2008, 3:29 AM), http:// 
carlosmiller.com/2008/12/27/amtrak-police-arrest-photographer-participating-in-
amtrak-photo-contest; see also Colbert Report, Nailed ‘Em:  Amtrak Photographer (Comedy 
Central television broadcast, Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://www.colbertnation.com/ 
the-colbert-report-videos/217341/february-02-2009/nailed--em-amtrak-photographer 
(humorously reporting the news story of Amtrak police arresting photographer Duane 
Kerzic); Daryl Lang, Arrested for Photographing a Train:  “It’s Almost Embarrassing,” PHOTO 
DISTRICT NEWS (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.pdnonline.com/pdn/content_display/ 
esearch/e3i81e87508e923955f84619b82090e19f2 (describing the “five-figure settle-
ment” of Kerzic’s false-arrest suit after broadcast of the Colbert piece (quoting Todd 
Maisel, Region 2 Director of the Nat’l Press Photographers Ass’n) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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acknowledging the “public’s general right to photograph the exterior 
of federal courthouses from publicly accessible spaces.”105 
Similar arrests have befallen recreational photographers around 
the country,106 as well as an art professor who photographed power 
lines in Snohomish, Washington,107 and a news photographer who 
photographed a nuclear plant in Vermont.108 
Many of these prosecutions have ultimately been dropped or 
dismissed, but the threat of arrest remains a potent deterrent to 
spontaneous photographers who have no deep commitment to cap-
turing any particular image.  Even for photographers and video-
graphers who set out to document specific interactions, the opportu-
nity to ultimately return to their efforts after an arrest does little to 
mitigate the obstacle to effective participation in digital discourse.  
The crucial importance of image capture lies precisely in its provision 
of verifiable contemporaneous records of events; those records are 
lost when arrest prevents recording. 
IV.  THE PUZZLES OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF                
PERVASIVE IMAGE CAPTURE 
Pervasive image capture confronts a landscape of legal risks that 
threatens its promises of public dialogue and private memory.  The 
conjunctive prospects of expanded common law torts, statutory con-
 
105 Stipulation and Order of Dismissal at 2, Musumeci v. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., No. 10-3370 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2010); see also David W. Dunlap, You Can Photo-
graph That Federal Building, N.Y. TIMES BLOGS (Oct. 18, 2010, 6:00 PM), 
http://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/you-can-photograph-that-federal-building.  
106 See Union Station:  A Comprehensive Look at the Private Management, the Public Space, 
and the Intermodal Spaces Present and Future:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Dev., 
Pub. Bldgs., and Emergency Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 110th 
Cong. 143-55 (2008) (statement of Erin McCann, amateur photographer) (describing 
harassment of photographers in Union Station); Annys Shin, When Freedom of Photogra-
phy Doesn’t Click, WASH. POST, July 26, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/25/AR2010072502795.html?nav=emailpage (report-
ing that a guard ordered a recreational photographer not to photograph a U.S. De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development building); Lang, supra note 104 (“It’s 
not just New York City Transit, it’s across the country” (quoting Todd Maisel, Region 2 
Director of the Nat’l Press Photographers Ass’n) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
107 See Scheier v. City of Snohomish, No. 07-1925, 2008 WL 4812336, at *1-3 (W.D. 
Wash. Nov. 4, 2008); see also Robert L. Jamieson, Jr., We’ve Seen the Enemy, and He Is Us:  
Photo Student Experiences the ‘Real Threat’ To America, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 
14, 2004, at B1, available at LEXIS (reporting that a photography student was detained 
by police for taking pictures of a tourist attraction at Ballard Locks). 
108 Linda Rothstein, Editor’s Note, Nuclear Insecurity, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIEN-
TISTS, Jan.–Feb. 2002, at 2. 
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straints, and the invocation of catchall statutes interact with law en-
forcement authority to retaliate against photographers or video-
graphers.  To resolve the confrontation, courts must address the status 
of the emerging medium under the First Amendment.  Although 
many courts have recognized First Amendment protection, their ana-
lyses do not effectively respond to other commentators and courts 
who suggest that image capture lies outside the aegis of the First 
Amendment.  It is to this task that I now turn. 
In the last decade, a solid line of courts has recognized that image 
capture can claim protection under the First Amendment.  The First 
Circuit upheld a damages award against a police officer who arrested 
an amateur video journalist for recording a conversation between 
government officials following a public meeting, commenting that the 
plaintiff’s activities involved “the exercise of his First Amendment 
rights.”109  The Second Circuit determined that the First Amendment 
protects the right of an art photographer to use nude models for a 
photo shoot.110  The Ninth Circuit sustained a cause of action against a 
police officer who allegedly assaulted an amateur photographer seek-
ing to film a political demonstration, recognizing a “First Amendment 
right to film matters of public interest.”111  The Eleventh Circuit ob-
 
109 Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Demarest v. 
Athol/Orange Cmty. Television, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 82, 94-95 (D. Mass. 2002) (find-
ing that producers for a community television channel had “a constitutionally pro-
tected right to record matters of public interest” and could not be precluded from re-
cording statements in public without signed consents); Cirelli v. Town of Johnston Sch. 
Dist., 897 F. Supp. 663, 669 (D.R.I. 1995) (protecting the right of a teacher to video-
tape health-code violations while on school grounds); Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 
F. Supp. 465, 473 (D.N.H. 1990) (finding First Amendment protection for a news pho-
tographer taking pictures at an accident scene). 
110 Tunick v. Safir, 228 F.3d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 
67, 82 (2d Cir. 2000) (“While there may be classroom hypotheticals that explore the hazy 
line between nude photography as unprotected conduct and nude photography as artis-
tic expression, this is not such a case.”).  Lower courts in the Second Circuit have recog-
nized that the First Amendment constrains efforts to interfere with image capture.  See, 
e.g., Davis v. Stratton, 575 F. Supp. 2d 410, 421 (N.D.N.Y 2008) (holding that the activity 
of a preacher videotaping his presentation on a college campus is protected), rev’d on oth-
er grounds, Davis v. Stratton, 360 F. App’x 182 (2d Cir. 2010); Baker v. City of New York, 
No. 01-4888, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18100, at *17-19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2002) (determin-
ing that a professional photographer offering to photograph passersby could invoke First 
Amendment protections); Krukowski v. Swords, 15 F. Supp. 2d 188, 194-96 (D. Conn. 
1998) (acknowledging that the photographer photographing and videotaping sessions of 
an aspiring model invoked First Amendment protections). 
111 Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Schnell v. 
City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 1969) (allowing a cause of action by 
news photographers who covered demonstrations at the 1968 Democratic National 
Convention in Chicago against the police for “interfering with plaintiffs’ constitutional 
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served that members of the public have “a First Amendment right, 
subject to reasonable time, manner and place restrictions, to photo-
graph or videotape police conduct” because “[t]he First Amendment 
protects the right to gather information about what public officials do 
on public property.”112  Federal trial judges in other circuits have come 
to similar conclusions.113 
These cases, however, in the main assert, rather than argue for, First 
Amendment protection,114 and other authorities question whether pro-
 
right to . . . photograph news events” (internal quotation marks omitted)), overruled on 
other grounds, City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Cuviello v. City of Stock-
ton, No. 07-1625, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4896, at *34-36 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2009) (hold-
ing that animal rights protestors have a First Amendment right to videotape a circus 
from a public street); Cuviello v. City of Oakland, No. 06-5517, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
59833, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2007) (same); cf. Johnson v. Hawe, 388 F.3d 676, 
682-83, 687 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that state law “does not criminalize the re-
cording of a ‘police officer in the performance of an official function on a public tho-
roughfare,’” but declining to reach the First Amendment claim on procedural grounds 
(quoting Alford v. Haner, 333 F.3d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 2003))); Alford, 333 F.3d at 976 
(same), rev’d on other grounds, Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004). 
112 Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Blacks-
ton v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding plaintiffs’ interest in filming 
public meetings may be protected by the First Amendment if the reason for the ban 
was not “content-neutral”); cf. Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155, 157-59 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(per curiam) (reversing the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to a police of-
ficer who arrested and seized the film of a political demonstration participant who 
photographed undercover officers). 
113 See Pomykacz v. Borough of W. Wildwood, 438 F. Supp. 2d 504, 513 n.14 
(D.N.J. 2006) (finding that plaintiff’s “photography . . . was part and parcel of her po-
litical activism” and therefore should be analyzed like speech under the First Amend-
ment);  Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (holding that 
the plaintiff had a First Amendment right to videotape state troopers conducting truck 
inspections on a public highway); Lambert v. Polk Cnty., 723 F. Supp. 128, 133 (S.D. 
Iowa 1989) (finding that the plaintiff had a First Amendment right to display and dis-
seminate a videotape he recorded of a street fight occurring while he was present with 
a video camera); Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F. Supp. 634, 638 (D. Minn. 
1972) (suggesting that a news photographer at a crime scene has a First Amendment 
right to be present “in public places and on public property to gather information, 
photographically or otherwise”); State v. Graber, No. 10-0647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 
7, at *34 (Sept. 27, 2010) (“Many courts have held that the video taping of public 
events is protected under the First Amendment. . . . With all due respect to the Mary-
land General Assembly, it cannot criminalize otherwise protected activity.”). 
114 The same is largely true of commentators.  See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The 
Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1511 (2000) (“It is inconceivable, for example, 
that a ban on capturing all photographic images in public could possibly be squared 
with the First Amendment . . . .”); cf. WILLIAM GOLDMAN, THE PRINCESS BRIDE:  S. MOR-
GENSTERN’S CLASSIC TALE OF TRUE LOVE AND HIGH ADVENTURE 114 (Harcourt 2007).   
 A notable exception is the thoughtful work of Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, who 
has considered in admirable depth the First Amendment protection of photography 
and the right to gather information more generally.  See Zimmerman, supra note 76, at 
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hibitions of image capture should raise First Amendment objections.115  
Even proponents of the virtues of image capture tend to be tentative in 
asserting its protected status in First Amendment theory and doctrine.116 
It is therefore important to examine in some detail both the basis for 
doubts and the reasons that those doubts are ultimately unsustainable. 
 
1231 (“Reason, and not emotion, ought to drive the development of the law about 
newsgathering.”); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to 
Say?  One View of the Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 297, 325-32 (2004) (arguing 
that the right to gather content for speech is a prerequisite to the full exercise of the 
right to free speech); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Overcoming Future Shock:  Estes Re-
visited, or a Modest Proposal for the Constitutional Protection of the News-Gathering Process, 
1980 DUKE L.J. 641, 653-65 (1980) (arguing that the right to record falls within the 
general category of “speech” and that different mediums convey different meanings); 
see also Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News, 67 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1097 (1999) (discussing First Amendment implications of antipaparazzi 
statutes and tort doctrine). 
115 See, e.g., Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, No. 09-2644, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 20430, at 
*36-37 (3d Cir. Pa. Oct. 4, 2010) (“[T]he cases addressing the right of access to informa-
tion and the right of free expression do not provide a clear rule regarding First Amend-
ment rights to obtain information by videotaping . . . police officers during traffic 
stops.”); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 212 n.14 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[V]ideotaping or photo-
graphing the police in the performance of their duties on public property may be a pro-
tected activity.”); Banks v. Gallagher, No. 08-1110, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55308, at *29-37 
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2010) (defendant police officer entitled to qualified immunity due to 
the lack of “a clearly established right to videotape a police officer”), adopted by Banks v. 
Gallagher, No. 08-1110, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45364 (M.D. Pa. May 10, 2010); Gravolet v. 
Tassin, No. 08-3646, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45876, at *11-12 (E.D. La. June 2, 2009) 
(same); McCormick v. City of Lawrence, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1206 (D. Kan. 2004) 
(“Even if Plaintiffs have alleged a constitutional violation, however, the court determines 
that it is not clearly established that destruction of recordings constitutes violation of the 
First Amendment.”), aff’d, 130 F. App’x 987 (10th Cir. 2005); see also cases and authorities 
cited infra notes 116, 118, 119, 139-41, and 179-79. 
116 See Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information:  To-
wards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 
255 (2004) (“[T]he Court has created a legal scheme governing a First Amendment 
right to gather information that is . . . fragmented and inconsistent . . . .”); Wasserman, 
supra note 81, at 614 (“The answers to these questions move us into an uncharted and 
under-theorized First Amendment realm.”); Zimmerman, supra note 76, at 1209 (“[I]t 
is not obvious whether a tort rule or criminal statute that prohibits recordation of 
something that can legally be heard or observed is a neutral regulation of an action or 
a direct restriction on speech.”); Mishra, supra note 81, at 1550 (“[T]he First Amend-
ment protects individuals . . . who distribute recordings of illegal police conduct.  But it 
probably does not protect individuals . . . who produce the recordings.”).   
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V.  IMAGE CAPTURE AND THE DEFINITION OF “SPEECH” 
A.  Images and Messages:  “Speech,” “Action,” and  
“Inherently Expressive” Media 
An initial set of objections begins with the words of the First 
Amendment:  its protection extends only to freedom of “speech” and 
“the press.”117  Some discursive acts which convey messages—for ex-
ample, American Sign Language gestures or tapping keys in Morse 
code—are clearly recognizable as “speech.”  But an image, it is said, is 
not necessarily “speech”; it “must communicate some idea in order to 
be protected under the First Amendment.”118  Image capture, skeptics 
maintain, records data rather than communicating ideas.119 
There is a core of force to this objection:  it is common currency 
that not all actions can claim First Amendment protection.  As the 
Court observed, “[I]t is possible to find some kernel of expression in 
almost every activity a person undertakes—for example, walking down 
the street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall—but such a 
kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of 
 
117 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
118 Montefusco v. Nassau County, 39 F. Supp. 2d 231, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing 
Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996)).  Montefusco also suggested 
that photographs captured by a voyeuristic hobbyist contained “no identifiable mes-
sage sought to be communicated” and therefore were without First Amendment pro-
tection.  Id. at 242, n.7.  See Ramberran v. Dellacona, No. 07-0304, 2008 U.S. Dist LEX-
IS 25476, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008) (stating that the plaintiff “has not alleged any 
expressive or artistic purpose for filming students in his mathematics class-
room . . . [and therefore] allegations fail to demonstrate any infringement of pro-
tected speech”); Porat v. Lincoln Towers Cmty. Ass’n, No. 04-3199, 2005 WL 646093, at 
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2005) (“[I]t is well established that in order to be protected un-
der the First Amendment, images must communicate some idea.”); Larsen v. Fort 
Wayne Police Dep’t, No. 09-0055, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 57955, at *11 (N.D. Ind. June 
11, 2010) (citing and quoting Porat); see also Dreibelbis v. Scholton, No. 05-2312, 2006 
U.S. Dist LEXIS 37217, at *10 (M.D. Pa. June 7, 2006) (“[A] dispute over child custody 
or visitation is of private, familial and personal concern. . . . Plaintiff’s videotaping was 
not a protected activity under the First Amendment . . . .”), aff’d, 274 F. App’x 183 (3d 
Cir. 2008); State v. Wright, 931 So. 2d 432, 443 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (finding a video 
voyeurism statute “not overbroad because the challenged statute affects conduct rather 
than speech”). 
119 Professor McDonald, for example, accepts this analysis of free speech protec-
tion while arguing for the importance of a separate right to gather information under 
the press clause.  See McDonald, supra note 116, at 268 (“Information gathering fre-
quently consists of predominantly non-expressive conduct that is unable to lay claim to 
the core First Amendment protection accorded to expression itself.”); see also Wasser-
man, supra note 81, at 655 (“[T]he conduct at issue—using cameras, audio and video 
recorders, and computers to gather information for dissemination—cannot, in itself, 
be characterized as ‘expressive activity.’” (quoting McDonald, supra note 116, at 270)). 
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the First Amendment.”120  In determining whether an isolated act is 
protectable “symbolic speech,”121 opinions of the Court often give 
weight to the presence or absence of a “message conveyed.”122 
In addressing this issue, however, it will not do to place too much 
emphasis on the words “speech” and “press.”  Handwritten letters fall 
uncontroversially within the protection of the First Amendment, 
though they are neither “spoken” nor printed on a “press.”  The Fra-
mers arguably viewed the First Amendment as a metonymic whole:  
protection of speech, press, and assembly were parts of the same fa-
bric of intellectual autonomy as religion.123   
In First Amendment doctrine, narrow parsing of the words of the 
Amendment has not determined its reach.  By its terms, the Amend-
ment binds only Congress.  Yet the First Amendment applies to ac-
tions of the federal executive and judiciary, and the First Amendment 
constrains the states not by virtue of its text, but because of incorpora-
tion through the due process clause.   
 
120 City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).  The Court in this case held 
that patronizing a dance hall for recreation was not protected speech.  Id.  The Su-
preme Court has regularly rejected the “view that an apparently limitless variety of 
conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends 
thereby to express an idea.”  United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968), quoted 
with approval in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993); Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397, 404 (1989); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (per curiam); see 
also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965). 
121 See, e.g.,  Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65 
(2006) (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376).  
122 See, e.g., id. at 63 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual 
Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 527 (1995)).  The Court also stated that the necessi-
ty of explanatory speech to convey the message “is strong evidence that the conduct 
at issue . . . is not so inherently expressive that it warrants protection.”  Id. at 66; see 
also, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999) (“Because the term ‘loi-
ter’ is defined as remaining in one place ‘with no apparent purpose,’ it is also clear 
that it does not prohibit any form of conduct that is apparently intended to convey a 
message.”); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (“[W]e have asked whether ‘[a]n intent to con-
vey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great 
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.’” (quoting Spence, 418 
U.S. at 410-11)). 
123 See, e.g., Resolutions Adopted by the Kentucky General Assembly (stating that 
the First Amendment guards “in the same sentence, and under the same words, the 
freedom of religion, of speech, and of the press, insomuch, that whatever violates ei-
ther, throws down the sanctuary which covers the others”), in 30 THE PAPERS OF THO-
MAS JEFFERSON 551, 552 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2003); see also Eugene Volokh, Symbolic 
Expression and the Original Meaning of the First Amendment, 97 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1059 (2009) 
(noting that early courts treated symbolic and verbal expression as “functionally equiv-
alent when it came to speech restrictions”). 
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More importantly, the requirement of identifying a “message con-
veyed” is generally applied by the Court only to conduct that is not 
considered “inherently expressive.”124  For courses of action that are 
recognized by social practice as comprising media of expression, the 
question is not whether a message is conveyed, but whether the con-
duct in question is a part of that recognized medium.125  The Court 
has recognized that “[m]usic, as a form of expression and communi-
cation, is protected under the First Amendment”126 without inquiring 
into the particular message communicated by the music, if indeed 
music could be rendered as propositional content.  It has acknowl-
edged that dancing “directed to an actual or hypothetical audience,” 
which “gives expression at least to generalized emotion or feeling,” ra-
ther than an articulable “message,” is “inherently expressive.”127  It has 
determined that the “protected expression that inheres in a parade is 
not limited to its banners and songs . . . for the Constitution looks 
beyond written or spoken words as mediums of expression.”128  Pa-
rades, in our society, are media of expression, like visual art and poe-
try:  “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of 
constitutional protection” for parades any more than it is for the “un-
questionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold 
 
124 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 49 (stating that conduct that is not “inherently expressive” 
does not receive protection under O’Brien); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 
695 n.22 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that “the simple act of joining the 
Scouts . . . is not inherently expressive”); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 
(2000) (plurality opinion) (noting that “[b]eing ‘in a state of nudity’ is not an inhe-
rently expressive condition” but that nude dancing may be protected depending on 
“‘whether the State’s regulation is related to the suppression of expression’” (quoting 
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403)); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 577 n.4 (1991) (Sca-
lia, J., concurring) (reasoning that nudity is “not normally engaged in for the purpose 
of communicating an idea or emotion” and therefore is not “inherently expressive,” 
or, in Justice Scalia’s words, “conventionally expressive”).  
125 Dean Robert Post highlighted this point a decade and a half ago.  See Robert 
Post, Essay, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1253-57 (1995) 
[hereinafter Post, Recuperating].  He reiterated the insight in Robert Post, Encryption 
Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 717 (2000) [hereinaf-
ter Post, Encryption].  While his precise criteria for “constitutionally recognized media 
for the communication of ideas,” Post, Recuperating, supra, at 1256, do not fully capture 
the relevant case law or considerations, his basic point that First Amendment doctrine 
borrows from social practice in recognizing “genre[s]” or “media” is profound and im-
portant.  Id. at 1253. 
126 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989). 
127 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 581 (Souter, J., concurring); see also sources cited supra 
note 124.  
128 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 
557, 569 (1995). 
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Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”129  Public monu-
ments constitute protected expression, though “monuments are al-
most certain to evoke different thoughts and sentiments in the minds 
of different observers, and the effect of monuments that do not con-
tain text is likely to be even more variable.”130 
So it is with captured images.  In the last two generations, emerg-
ing technology and social practice have made captured images part of 
our cultural and political discourse.131  Recognizing this development, 
the Court has treated images as media of communication without in-
quiring into an illusively specific message.  In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wil-
son, the Court reversed a conclusion reached four decades earlier that 
movies lie outside of the protection of the First Amendment, com-
menting that “[i]t cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a signif-
icant medium for the communication of ideas[] . . . ranging from di-
rect espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of 
thought which characterizes all artistic expression.”132  In subsequent 
decisions, the Court regularly confirmed that images in films can claim 
First Amendment protection whether displayed publicly or reviewed in 
private, without inquiry into a particular “message conveyed.”133 
 
129 Id. 
130 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1136 (2009).  
[I]t frequently is not possible to identify a single “message” that is conveyed by 
an object or structure . . . . [By displaying] a privately donated monu-
ment . . . a city engages in expressive conduct, but the intended and perceived 
significance of that conduct may not coincide with the thinking of the monu-
ment’s donor or creator.   
Id.  
131 See, e.g., DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS:  THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 
371 (1973) (arguing that “[p]hotography took the first giant step toward democratiz-
ing the repeatable experience” and transforming the nature of public discourse); KE-
VIN MICHAEL DELUCA, IMAGE POLITICS:  THE NEW RHETORIC OF ENVIRONMENTAL AC-
TIVISM xi-xiii (1999) (examining the use of “image events” as a political tool); W.J.T. 
MITCHELL, PICTURE THEORY:  ESSAYS ON VISUAL AND VERBAL REPRESENTATION 11-34 
(1994) (arguing for recognition of the “pictorial turn” defining cultural discourse); 
Kevin Michael DeLuca & Jennifer Peeples, From Public Sphere to Public Screen:  Democracy, 
Activism, and the “Violence” of Seattle, 19 CRITICAL STUD. IN MEDIA COMMC’N 125, 127 
(2002) (introducing the “‘public screen’ as a necessary supplement to the metaphor of 
the public sphere for understanding today’s political scene”). 
132 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952), overruling in part Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n 
of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).  The Joseph Burstyn Court’s position was prefigured in 
dictum in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948), which said, 
“We have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in 
the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment.”   
133 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826-27 (2000) 
(invalidating limitations on an “adult oriented” cable channel); Schad v. Borough of 
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The same conclusion has applied to images captured in a single 
frame.134  Without inquiry into particular messages, the Court has dep-
loyed First Amendment principles to invalidate the prohibition of dis-
play in public view of “any motion picture, slide, or other exhibit in 
which the human male or female bare buttocks” appear,135 the ban on 
published illustrations that involve photographs of United States cur-
rency which are not “newsworthy,”136 an injunction against display of 
“images observable” by women seeking abortions,137 and a statute pro-
hibiting the production or possession of “any visual depiction, includ-
ing any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-
generated image or picture” that “appears to be[] of a minor engag-
ing in sexually explicit conduct.”138 
In the current state of the law and culture of discourse, captured 
images—like words inscribed on parchment—fall within the protec-
tion of “freedom of speech.” 
 
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) (“Entertainment, as well as political and ideo-
logical speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and televi-
sion, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works, fall within the First 
Amendment guarantee.”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565, 568 (1969) (reversing 
an obscenity conviction for possession of three reels of eight-millimeter film and stat-
ing that “[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no busi-
ness telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what 
films he may watch”). 
134 Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973) (stating that First Amend-
ment standards apply “to moving pictures, to photographs, and to words in 
books . . . . As with pictures, films, paintings, drawings, and engravings, both oral utter-
ance and the printed word have First Amendment protection . . . .”); cf. Massachusetts 
v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 591 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Photography, painting, 
and other two-dimensional forms of artistic reproduction . . . are plainly expressive activi-
ties that ordinarily qualify for First Amendment Protection.”); United States v. Thirty-
Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376-77 (1971) (plurality opinion) (applying First 
Amendment-based procedural requirements to the seizure of photographs).   
135 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 207 (1975) (quoting a city or-
dinance) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
136 Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648 (1984) (plurality opinion). 
137 Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994). 
138 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 241 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2256(8)(B)(2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Ste-
vens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1590 (2010) (invalidating a prohibition of depictions of animal 
cruelty:  “Most hunting videos, for example, are not obviously instructional in nature, 
except in the sense that all life is a lesson.”); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 n.18 
(1982) (stating that depictions of nudity, “without more,” are protected expression); cf. 
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 113 n.9, 115 n.11 (1990) (stating that a statute punish-
ing a parent for giving “a family friend a picture of the parent’s infant taken while the 
infant was unclothed” would “criminalize[] constitutionally protected conduct,” but 
observing that, as construed, the statute prohibiting “possession and viewing of child 
pornography” did not reach that conduct). 
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B. “Speech” and the Question of Audience 
To conclude that images can comprise constitutionally protected 
expression does not end the matter.  Skeptics raise a second objec-
tion.  They argue that prohibitions on image capture, as opposed to 
display, do not constitute prohibitions on “speech” subject to First 
Amendment protection because the act of capturing images—unlike 
their display—does not speak to an audience.139 
As one court put the claim, the act of capturing an image “does 
not partake of the attributes of expression; it is conduct, pure and 
simple.”140  Another court took a similar approach:  to establish First 
Amendment protection, “there must still be (1) a message to be 
communicated and (2) an audience to receive that message, regard-
less of the medium in which the message is sought to be ex-
 
139 This position emerged early in the second half of the twentieth century.  E.g., 
Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1971) (“Privilege concepts de-
veloped . . . in privacy actions in which publication is an essential component are not 
relevant in determining liability for intrusive conduct antedating publication.”); Alfred 
Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1279 
(1976) (“The act of intrusion does not involve communication.  There are no problems 
under the [F]irst [A]mendment when a recovery is granted against the landlord who 
bugs the bedroom of his tenants . . . .”); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times 
to Time:  First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 
935, 957 (1968) (“Intrusion does not raise [F]irst [A]mendment difficulties since its per-
petration does not involve speech or other expression.  It occurs by virtue of the physical 
or mechanical observation of the private affairs of another . . . .”). 
 The idea recurs in contemporary analysis.  E.g., State v. Wright, 40-0945 (La. 
App. 2 Cir. 5/19/06); 931 So. 2d 432, 443 (ruling that Louisiana’s video voyeurism 
statute “is not overbroad because the challenged statute affects conduct rather than 
speech”); John Greenman, On Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1340 (2008) 
(“[Constitutionally protected] communication occurs [only] when Person A tries to 
convey a thought—some idea or feeling—to Person B, and Person B can freely choose 
whether to accept that thought.”); McClurg, supra note 55, at 995 n.22 (claiming 
that “the tort of intrusion . . . does not directly implicate the First Amendment be-
cause it focuses upon the manner in which information is acquired, rather than the 
dissemination of such information”). 
140 D’Amario v. Providence Civic Ctr. Auth., 639 F. Supp. 1538, 1541 (D.R.I. 1986), 
aff’d without opinion, 815 F.2d 692 (1st Cir. 1987); see also Jones v. Lakeview Sch. Dist., 
No. 06-0630, 2007 WL 2084341, at *7 (N.D. Ohio July 19, 2007) (ruling that taking pic-
tures on school property “does not partake of the attributes of expression; it is conduct 
pure and simple” (quoting S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks Serving Summit Cnty., No. 04-
2329, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 40027, at *10 (N.D. Ohio June 16, 2006) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); Porat v. Lincoln Towers Cnty. Ass’n, No. 04-3199, 2005 WL 
646093, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2005) (denying protection to “purely private recrea-
tional, non-communicative photography” taken for photographer’s personal use), 
aff’d, 464 F.3d 274 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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pressed. . . . [I]f either is lacking, there is absolutely nothing to trans-
mit ‘from mind to mind.’”141 
So, too, a thoughtful Third Circuit judge limited protection of 
video recording, noting that the plaintiff “does not allege the [defen-
dant] Township interfered with its speech or other expressive activity.  
Rather, the alleged constitutional violation consisted of a restriction 
on [plaintiff’s] right to receive and record information.”142 
To be sure, one element of the freedom of expression that the First 
Amendment protects is the opportunity to communicate ideas, emo-
tions, experiences, and information to an audience.  On analysis, how-
ever, the claim that image capture falls outside the First Amendment 
because it collects rather than disseminates information runs aground. 
1.  Image Capture, Broadcast, and Technological Fortuity 
In the emerging environment of pervasive image capture, the dif-
ference between capturing images and disseminating images erodes 
rapidly.  Even for skeptics who insist on an audience as a condition of 
First Amendment protection, images which are immediately dissemi-
nated upon capture (as in live video broadcasting) constitute “speech.”  
The same would presumably be true in the case of an image imme-
diately conveyed to a single recipient.143  As I have noted, sharing quo-
tidian images with friends is an increasingly common use of cell phone 
cameras, and contemporary technology makes it both possible and at-
tractive for cell phone users to upload images immediately and auto-
matically upon capture to websites accessible to friends and family.144  
 
141 Montefusco v. Nassau Cnty., 39 F. Supp. 2d 231, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
142 Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Twp. of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 183 (3d Cir. 1999). 
143 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001) (“It is true that the deli-
very of a tape recording might be regarded as conduct, but given that the purpose of 
such a delivery is to provide the recipient with the text of recorded statements, it is like 
the delivery of a handbill or a pamphlet, and as such, it is the kind of ‘speech’ that the 
First Amendment protects.”); id. at 533 (recognizing a First Amendment interest in 
avoiding chilling private conversations); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation En-
ters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (recognizing a First Amendment interest in private papers 
and letters); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409 (1974) (“The wife of a prison 
inmate who is not permitted to read all that her husband wanted to say to her has suf-
fered an abridgment of her interest in communicating with him as plain as that which 
results from censorship of her letter to him.”), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh 
v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); cf. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (holding 
that seizure of books and private correspondence is subject to stringent review rooted 
in First Amendment protection). 
144 See, e.g., Help, FLIXWAGON, http://www.flixwagon.com/help/index#a1 (last vi-
sited Oct. 15, 2010) (“Flixwagon is a mobile phone and web application that allows us-
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For audience skeptics, this presumably would suffice to constitute 
“speech” transmitted “from mind to mind.”  Yet it puts undue weight 
on technological fortuity to distinguish for First Amendment purposes 
between users who upload their images immediately and automatical-
ly, and those who either by choice or because of technological limits 
pause to edit their captured images before posting them on websites 
or sending them to correspondents. 
We would recognize police seizure of, or prosecution for, drafts of 
letters or manuscripts as an interference with freedom of expression, 
even if the seizure occurred before the writer had decided to send or 
publish them, though no designated “audience” had been deprived of 
their content.  So, too, image capture before the decision to transmit 
images falls within the scope of the emerging medium.145  Indeed, the 
act of delaying publication in order to edit the stream of images seems 
more manifestly a part of protected expression than the act of auto-
matically disseminating images wholesale.146 
2.  Diaries, Internal Dialogue, and Memory 
It is simply not the case, moreover, that an external audience is or 
should be a necessary condition of First Amendment protection.  The 
reversal of Robert Stanley’s conviction for possession of three reels of 
film containing images deemed obscene by the State of Georgia rested 
not on any plans to convey the film to other audiences, but on Stan-
ley’s personal right “to read or observe what he pleases . . . in the pri-
vacy of his own home.”147  Had he recorded the material himself, the 
result would have been no different. 
 
ers to broadcast and share live videos from their mobile phones to the [I]nternet.”); 
Photocopter, NTELOS WIRELESS, http://www.nteloswireless.com/popups/photocopter. 
php (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (“Photocopter saves all your pictures to your PC and 
web albums instantly.”); Qik Overview, QIK, http://qik.com/info/overview (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2010) (allowing users to “[c]apture special or spontaneous moments on video 
using your mobile phone” and to “[s]hare the moments live or anytime later with 
anyone you choose”); Robin Wauters, ImageShack Updates iPhone App with Powerful 
Photo, Video Sharing Options, TECHCRUNCH ( Jan. 12, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/ 
2010/01/12/imageshack-uploader-iphone-app (describing an iPhone application with 
capacity to share directly to YouTube and Twitter in real time).  
145 Cf. Zimmerman, supra note 76, at 1208-09 & 1208 n.106 (comparing modern 
note-taking tools—tape recorders and video cameras—to traditional paper and pen, 
and suggesting that paper notes are likely to be protected under the First Amendment). 
146 Cf. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547-48 (noting that “compilation of pure fact[] 
entails originality”). 
147 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969); see also United States v. Williams, 
553 U.S. 285, 288 (2008) (“[W]e have held that the government may . . . not criminal-
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It is plain that a statute punishing me when I make an entry in my 
diary, draft a “memorandum to file,” or put an innocuous picture in 
my scrapbook would violate the First Amendment.  A diary entry be-
gins a process of communicating with an audience of one:  my entries 
are subject to review by my future self.  Analogously, many contempo-
rary cell phone users capture images with an eye to future review.148 
Diaries of words or images need not communicate with outsiders 
to merit constitutional protection under the First Amendment.149  
From the time that it began to incorporate the First Amendment as a 
protection against state actions, the Court has recognized that the 
Amendment’s principles extend to thought and speech—not to 
speech alone—observing that “freedom of thought, and speech [con-
stitute] . . . the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every 
other form of freedom.”150  Nor has the Court abandoned the position 
in recent years.  While continuing to recognize the importance of the 
First Amendment’s function in protecting communication with au-
diences, the Court has avowed that “freedom of thought and expres-
sion ‘includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain 
 
ize the mere possession of obscene material involving adults.”); United States v. Reidel, 
402 U.S. 351, 356 (1971) (refusing to extend First Amendment protection to distribute 
obscene materials:  “The focus of [Stanley] was on freedom of mind and thought and 
on the privacy of one’s home.”). 
148 See supra Section II.A and note 18. 
149 See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 51-54 (1989) (ar-
guing that defining “protected acts of expression” as “acts intended to communicate” is 
inadequate, as not all speech is intended for an outside audience (emphasis omitted)); cf. 
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559 (concluding that the First Amendment shields “a conco-
mitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom 
of speech in its affirmative aspect” (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 
244 N.E. 2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
150 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937), overruled on other grounds by 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) and quoted with approval in Fed. Election 
Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986); see Stanley v. Geor-
gia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (“Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought 
of giving government the power to control men’s minds.”); Schneider v. Smith, 390 
U.S. 17, 25 (1968) (“[The First Amendment] create[s] a preserve where the views of 
the individual are made inviolate.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) 
(“The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to 
print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read and freedom of 
inquiry, freedom of thought . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also United States v. 
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[I]f there is any 
principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any oth-
er it is the principle of free thought . . . .”), overruled by Girouard v. United States, 328 
U.S. 61 (1946). 
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from speaking at all.’”151  The Court has twice affirmed that “[a]t the 
heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person 
should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of 
expression, consideration, and adherence.”152 
Speech is protected not simply as a way of communicating with 
others, but as a means of defining the speaker’s thoughts, intellect, 
and memories.  As Justice Kennedy observed, “[t]he right to think is 
the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the 
government because speech is the beginning of thought.”153 
The government is barred from intermeddling in both speech and 
thought because both undergird the constitutional commitments to 
personal autonomy and popular sovereignty.154  It is not uncommon to 
find one’s thoughts clarified or indeed formed by the process of writing 
them.155  So, too, the capture of images can effectively fix thoughts in 
the mental universe and make them available for future reflection.156  It 
is as much an interference with freedom of thought to punish solitary 
speech as it is to punish communication to an audience. 
If the government were to be magically endowed with the capacity 
to prevent the retention of solitary memories in the fashion of the 
neuralizer in the film Men in Black,157 the exercise of that capacity 
 
151 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559 (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 
(1977)); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (“The First Amendment 
securely protects the freedom to make—or decline to make—one’s own speech . . . .”). 
152 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994), quoted with approval in 
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 220; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Liberty 
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, 
and certain intimate conduct.”). 
153 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002); cf. ANDY CLARK, SUPER-
SIZING THE MIND 58 (2008) (“[A]s soon as we formulate a thought in words or on pa-
per, it becomes an object, for both ourselves and for others . . . the kind of things we 
can have thoughts about.”). 
154 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(“Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to 
make men free to develop their faculties . . . . They believed that freedom to think as 
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread 
of political truth . . . .”), overruled in part on other grounds by Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444 (1967) (per curiam) and quoted with approval in Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 
U.S. 640, 660-61 (2000). 
155 See E.M. FORSTER, ASPECTS OF THE NOVEL 43 (1927) (“‘How can I tell what I 
think till I see what I say?’”), cited in Adam Phillips, On What We Need:  A Celebration of the 
Work of Emmanuel Ghant, 11 PSYCHOLANALYTIC DIALOGUES 1, 6 (2001).  
156 See VAN DIJCK, supra note 19, at 148-69 (discussing the implications of tech-
nology with increased memory capacity on the preservation and accessibility of prior 
experiences). 
157 MEN IN BLACK (Columbia Pictures 1997).  
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would manifestly violate the “freedom of thought” guaranteed by the 
First Amendment although no audience would be involved.158  No 
such device exists, yet.159  But memories recorded externally are vul-
nerable to legal and technological interference.160 
When an individual records her sense impressions or draws 
sketches in her diary, she constructs the scaffolding of her future 
thoughts much as interior memories construct the scaffolding of cog-
nition.  The same is true of captured images.161  Human brains are 
adapted to use physical phenomena as “external storage” to simplify 
cognitive tasks, and regular consultation of and reliance on notes or 
diaries are sensibly considered elements of an extended cognitive sys-
tem.162  Recorded images can serve the same function.  Indeed, there 
are reports of the use of photographic “life logs” by Alzheimer’s pa-
tients as prosthetic memories to retain a sense of their identity.163 
 
158 See, e.g., Charles Fried, Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise Lecture, Perfect Freedom, 
Perfect Justice, 78 B.U. L. REV. 717, 735 (1998) (“[T]he First Amendment as freedom of 
thought . . . protects against government interfering with the process of judgment it-
self . . . .”); Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment:  A First Amend-
ment Perspective, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 17-19 (1989) (describing the Supreme Court’s 
use of the First Amendment to protect freedom of thought). 
159 But cf. Adam Kolber, Freedom of Memory Today, 1 NEUROETHICS 145, 145-47 
(2008) (describing memory-erasing effects of drugs, including one anesthetic—
propofol—that “frequently ‘erases’ the patient’s memory of events that precede injec-
tion by a few minutes”); Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting:  The Legal and Ethical Im-
plications of Memory Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1562 (2006) (“While true mem-
ory erasure is still the domain of science fiction, less dramatic means of dampening the 
strength of a memory may have already been developed.” (footnote omitted)). 
160 Cf. Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Two Classics from Kindle. (One is ‘1984’), N.Y. TIMES, 
July 18, 2009, at B1 (describing how Amazon.com “remotely deleted” digital editions of 
two books from the electronic readers on which customers were storing them). 
161 To be sure, sketching and diary entry involve the reduction of sense to symbol 
but image capture does not.  But if an audience is involved, captured images fall within 
the ambit of the First Amendment.  See supra Section V.A; cf. L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 
973 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing prior court rulings that have held that 
photographs express authorship sufficiently to warrant copyright); Jewelers’ Circular 
Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 274 F. 932, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding that pho-
tographs can be copyrighted “because no photograph, however simple, can be unaf-
fected by the personal influence of the author” (citing Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho-
graphing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903))), aff’d, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922). 
162 See CLARK, supra note 153, at 21 (discussing use of “the world as external sto-
rage”); id. at 41 (noting how the brain uses “environmental structure” and “cognitive 
artifacts” equivalently to internal storage); id. at 76-78 (discussing how externally rec-
orded memories function as an element of cognition); id. at 104-09 (arguing for a 
“cognitive extension” view that considers the brain and external artifacts to be part of a 
single system). 
163 VAN DIJK, supra note 19, at 58-60. 
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Pervasive image capture allows individuals to record memories. 
Legal interference with recording abridges such individuals’ freedom 
to reflect effectively on those experiences, truncating the freedom of 
thought that the principles of the First Amendment guarantee.164 
3.  Preconditions and Elements of Communication 
Beyond these nonaudience-based roles, the modern process of 
image capture is an essential element in producing, and ultimately 
disseminating, photos, videos, and montages which modern First 
Amendment doctrine solidly recognizes as protected media of com-
munication.  The increasing integration of image capture with com-
munication devices ranging from cell phones to iPhones to PDAs 
makes it clear that contemporary image capture is part of a broader 
digital ecology of communication.  One might try to dissect the me-
dium into its component acts of image acquisition, recording, and dis-
semination and conclude that recording is an unprotected “act” with-
out an audience.  But this maneuver is as inappropriate as 
maintaining that the purchase of stationery or the application of ink 
to paper are “acts” and therefore outside of the aegis of the First 
Amendment. 
Paint can be an essential precondition to artistic endeavor; a pro-
hibition on the possession of aerosol spray paint cans was invalidated 
on First Amendment grounds at the instance of artists who sought to 
“create graffiti art in lawful venues on lawful surfaces.”165  And though 
not without controversy, there is wide support for the proposition that 
reproducing copyrighted images and materials as part of the process 
 
164 In the machinations surrounding the Global War on Terror, one clear effect of 
the rules that precluded legislators from recording the details of the programs to 
which they were exposed was to make it more difficult to reflect effectively on the in-
formation.  See Dan Eggen & Walter Pincus, Varied Rationales Muddle Issue of NSA Eaves-
dropping, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2006, at A5 (reporting on rules barring legislators from 
taking notes on briefings regarding an NSA warrantless-surveillance program); cf. 
United States v. Cabra, 622 F.2d 182, 184-85 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the district 
court’s prohibition on in-courtroom note-taking was an abuse of discretion); Gold-
schmidt v. Coco, 413 F. Supp. 2d 949, 952-53 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“A sweeping prohibition 
of all note-taking by any outside party seems unlikely to withstand a challenge under 
the First Amendment.”). 
165 Vincenty v. Bloomberg, 476 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 2007); see also United States v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 497 F.2d 102, 106 (5th Cir. 1974) (concluding that sketch-
ing in the courtroom is protected by the First Amendment and that a “total ban” on 
the publication of such sketches is “too broad to withstand constitutional scrutiny”). 
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of personal use in production of subsequent authorial works is pro-
tected by the First Amendment.166 
Dean Robert Post has noted:  “If the state were to prohibit the use 
of [film] projectors without a license, First Amendment coverage 
would undoubtedly be triggered.  This is not because projectors con-
stitute speech acts, but because they are integral to the forms of inte-
raction that comprise the genre of the cinema.”167  The point holds 
beyond the physical links in the chain of communication.  Almost 
all media of expression can be broken down into a series of social 
practices and preconditions that are not themselves expressive.  Jus-
tice Scalia has observed: 
  In any economy operated on even the most rudimentary principles 
of division of labor, effective public communication requires the speaker 
to make use of the services of others.  An author may write a novel, but 
he will seldom publish and distribute it himself.  A freelance reporter 
may write a story, but he will rarely edit, print, and deliver it to subscrib-
ers.  To a government bent on suppressing speech, this mode of organi-
 
166 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1169 (9th Cir. 
2007) (discussing Perfect 10’s claim that “users who link to infringing websites auto-
matically make ‘cache’ copies of full-size images” and reasoning that “even assuming 
such automatic copying could constitute direct infringement, it is a fair use”); Duffy v. 
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 268, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that where 
an author photocopied a portion of a copyrighted work in the course of her research, 
the photocopying amounted to fair use and was immune to copyright claims).  The 
Court has suggested that the fair use defense in copyright cases is required by the First 
Amendment.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-21 (2003). 
 An array of commentators argue that copying for personal use or as part of au-
thorial transformation to a new work is constitutionally protected.  See, e.g., Julie E. Co-
hen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1198-1205 
(2007); Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1897-1903 (2007); 
Rebecca Tushnet, Essay, Copy This Essay:  How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and 
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 545-57 (2004).  But see David McGowan, Some 
Realism About the Free-Speech Critique of Copyright, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 435, 454 (2005) 
(“To the extent the law treats people as so dependent on culture that they cannot 
speak without copying, the law has less reason to respect what people say as reflecting a 
preference of their own.”). 
167 Post, Encryption, supra note 125, at 717; cf. Zimmerman, supra note 76, at 1209 
(“The method and the result do not segment . . . conveniently into discrete parts.”). 
 The Court has put the matter in similar terms.  First Amendment scrutiny applies 
to statutes “based on a nonexpressive activity [that] has the inevitable effect of singling 
out those engaged in expressive activity” or to sanctions against activity “intimately re-
lated to expressive conduct protected under the First Amendment.”  Arcara v. Cloud 
Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706 n.3, 706-07 (1986).  See also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 
514, 527 (2001) (“[D]elivery of a tape recording might be regarded as conduct, but 
given that the purpose of such a delivery is to provide the recipient with the text of 
recorded statements, it is like the delivery of a handbill or a pamphlet, and as such, it is 
the kind of ‘speech’ that the First Amendment protects.”). 
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zation presents opportunities:  Control any cog in the machine, and you 
can halt the whole apparatus. . . . The right to speak would be largely in-
effective if it did not include the right to engage in financial transactions 
that are the incidents of its exercise.
168
  
Targeting image capture can provide a similarly effective means 
for censoring the protected flow of images into public and private dis-
course.  The typical police officer, plaintiff, or complainant in the  
image-capture cases canvassed above is not concerned with avoiding 
observation or preserving seclusion simplicter.  She is interested, ra-
ther, in assuring that evidence of dubious or potentially embarrassing 
actions is not credibly conveyed by the observer to a wider audience by 
transmission of the captured image.  There are few cases on record of 
police officers arresting tourists who capture videos of polite official 
responses to inquiries for directions.  Prohibitions on image capture 
are deployed to suppress inconvenient truths.169 
It is precisely this suppression at which the First Amendment is di-
rected.  First Amendment doctrine regularly disapproves of legal rules 
that vest officials with unbridled discretion, because officials are likely 
to bring legal sanctions to suppress communications they find uncon-
genial.170  Broad and malleable prohibitions on image capture are well 
 
168 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 251-52 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); see also Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign 
Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 97-98 (1982) (finding that disclosure of unpopular minor-party 
disbursements could cripple the party’s viability because those who provide “services 
rendered scarce by public hostility and suspicion . . . would be . . . vulnerable to 
threats, harassment, and reprisals . . . and those seeking to harass may disrupt com-
mercial activities on the basis of expenditure information”). 
 Justice Scalia wrote in partial dissent in McConnell, but his analysis was adopted 
by the majority in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. at 898. See 
also id. (“Government could repress speech by silencing certain voices at any of the 
various points in the speech process.” (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 251 (opinion of 
Scalia, J.))).  
169 The 9/11 security cases are only partial exceptions.  There is nothing embar-
rassing about Amtrak trains, but the motivating concern still seems to be the preven-
tion of the transmission of images to notional terrorists.  
170 See, e.g., Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992) (find-
ing that concern with officials “encouraging some views and discouraging others” re-
quires the rule that “[t]he First Amendment prohibits the vesting of such unbridled 
discretion in a government official”); Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1051 
(1991) (“The prohibition against vague regulations of speech is based in part on the 
need to eliminate the impermissible risk of discriminatory enforcement, for history 
shows that speech is suppressed when either the speaker or the message is critical of 
those who enforce the law.” (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58, 361 
(1983) and Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974)); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of 
Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225-26 (1990) (“[A] scheme that places ‘unbridled discretion in 
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adapted to this end.  Justice Scalia’s observation regarding the vulne-
rability of “cogs in the machine” was made in dissent, but Supreme 
Court majorities have regularly invoked the First Amendment to inva-
lidate regulations that impose burdens on “actions” without audiences 
where the targets are essential preconditions to communication. 
The point is clear with regard to “actions” involved in the chain of 
distribution:  to forbid handing out leaflets that may end up as litter, 
placing newsracks on public property, or distributing books to stores 
may violate the First Amendment, even if drafting, printing, and read-
ing are left undisturbed.171  But the Court has also struck down regula-
tions that target component “actions” that precede the chain of con-
nection between speaker and audience. 
The Court has invalidated the impositions of taxes on ink and paper 
used in publications, as well as taxes imposed on advertising revenue.172  
It struck down a statute that forbade publishers to pay authors writing 
about crimes in which they had participated.173  Although the statute 
precluded payment rather than either authorship or publication, 
Whether the First Amendment ‘speaker’ is considered to be [the au-
thor], whose income the statute places in escrow because of the story he 
has told, or Simon & Schuster, which can publish books about crime 
with the assistance of only those criminals willing to forgo remuneration 
 
the hands of a government official or agency . . . may result in censorship.’” (quoting 
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, (1988))); City of Houston v. 
Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 453, 471-72 (1987) (finding a “municipal ordinance that makes it 
unlawful to interrupt a police officer in the performance of his or her duties” to be 
“unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment”); Saia v. New York, 334 
U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (holding unconstitutional a standardless city ordinance prohibit-
ing the use of sound amplification devices without permission of the chief of police). 
171 E.g., Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 762-72 (newsracks); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 
372 U.S. 58, 65 n.6 (1963) (circulation of books); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 
141, 143 (1943) (citing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939)) (literature distri-
bution despite potential for litter); see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. 
v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165-66 (2002) (protecting the right to canvass door-to-
door under the First Amendment).  
  For analysis of the ways in which burdens on intermediaries interfere with constitu-
tionally protected speech, see Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy:  The First Amendment, 
Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11 (2006). 
172 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 
592-93 (1983) (invalidating a tax on ink and paper used in producing publications); 
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250-51 (1936) (invalidating a tax on newspa-
per advertisements). 
173 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 
U.S. 105, 116 (1991). 
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for at least five years, the statute plainly imposes a financial disincen-
tive . . . on speech . . . .
174
  
The Court reached a similar conclusion regarding a statute that 
precluded members of the federal civil service from receiving payment 
for writing or speaking engagements, stating that although the statute 
neither prohibits any speech nor discriminates among speakers based 
on the content or viewpoint of their messages, its prohibition on com-
pensation unquestionably imposes a significant burden on expressive 
activity. . . .  
 The large-scale disincentive to Government employees’ expression al-
so imposes a significant burden on the public’s right to read and hear 
what the employees would otherwise have written and said.
175
  
Furthermore, the Court has recognized that group association is 
often a precondition for “‘[e]ffective advocacy of both public and pri-
vate points of view, particularly controversial ones,’” and has extended 
First Amendment protection to the “act” of association as a way of 
making the “speech” of members effective.176  Indeed, the Court recog-
nized that privacy may, in turn, be necessary to association; it has pro-
tected the “acts” of refusing to disclose the membership lists of political 
organizations on First Amendment grounds.177 
Image capture is a precondition for effective participation in the 
contemporary visual ecology of communication.  To post an image 
from life on Flickr, YouTube, or one’s own blog, or to send it to a 
friend by text message or e-mail, one must first capture the image.  A 
prohibition on image capture is effectively a prohibition on the prac-
tice of sharing spontaneous images from life.  As Professor Smolla ob-
serves, to prohibit capture of public images without consent would  
violate the First Amendment because it “would cripple communica-
 
174 Id. 
175 United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468, 470 (1995). 
176 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 908 (1982) (quoting NAACP 
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)); see also Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. for 
Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981) (noting the “importance of 
freedom of association in guaranteeing the right of people to make their voices heard 
on public issues”). 
177 See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 558 (1963) 
(finding unconstitutional a legislative inquiry into the membership list of the NAACP); 
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960) (holding unconstitutional a state sta-
tute requiring teachers to disclose all organizations to which they belong); NAACP v. 
Alabama, 357 U.S. at 462-63 (determining that forced disclosure of membership lists of 
an organization engaged in advocacy is unconstitutional). 
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tion and expression . . . [and it] would effectively give to the actors in 
human events a quality of ownership over news and history itself.”178 
Two final reasons caution against placing image capture beyond 
the protection of the First Amendment.  First, images are often more 
salient than verbal descriptions.  Their apparently self-authenticating 
character gives them disparate authority, and their rhetorical impact 
encompasses the proverbial “thousand words.”  Participants in public 
dialogue who are barred from capturing images are at a substantial 
discursive disadvantage vis-à-vis those who can record from life.  Offi-
cials engage in virtually unchecked surveillance of public encounters.  
A rule that bars citizens from capturing images gives unbalanced au-
thority to official framing. 
Second, in the modern environment, the marginal cost of the 
physical composition and transmission of speech has dropped to close 
to zero; the limiting factor of public discourse is the cost of acquiring 
the information to disseminate.  In such an environment, courts 
should be particularly reluctant to expand doctrines that allow the 
state or aggressive plaintiffs to raise selectively the cost of acquiring 
inconvenient images. 
VI.  THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION FOR IMAGE CAPTURE 
That image capture falls within the ambit of First Amendment 
protection does not establish the degree of that protection.  A final set 
of skeptics acknowledges that image capture implicates First Amend-
ment principles but maintains that those principles permit its broad 
regulation.  Some invoke the proposition that constitutionally recog-
nized expression rights do not supersede “generally applicable” rules 
of tort, contract, or criminal law.179  Others maintain that the expres-
sive interests in image capture are counterbalanced by the importance 
of protecting competing interests in privacy or public security.180  Nei-
 
178 Smolla, supra note 114, at 1128. 
179 See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971) (“The First 
Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means into 
the precincts of another’s home or office.”); Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy 
and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1173-74, 1186-87 (2005) (arguing that 
rules of “general applicability” do not “fall within the scope of the First Amendment”); see 
also Mishra, supra note 81, at 1551 (“[T]he Amendment does not excuse citizens from 
state liability for recording police, even where citizens allege police misconduct.”). 
180 See Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less:  Justifying Privacy Protections 
Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 983-84 (2003) (arguing that, in balancing freedom 
of speech against other interests, not all forms of speech are valued as highly as privacy). 
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ther of these arguments warrants broadly exempting prohibitions of 
image capture from First Amendment scrutiny. 
A.  “Generally Applicable Laws” and the Right to Gather Information 
Individual Justices have regularly argued in dissent that the First 
Amendment requires effective accommodations by the government to 
provide access to information necessary for informed discussion of 
public affairs.181  The Court’s majority, however, has rejected an un-
adorned First Amendment “right to gather information” that super-
sedes other legal obligations. 
The tone was set in 1965 in Zemel v. Rusk, in which the Court re-
jected a claim that the denial of a passport to travel to Cuba interfered 
with the plaintiffs’ claimed First Amendment right to gather informa-
tion.  The Court commented: 
There are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by inge-
nious argument in the garb of decreased data flow.  For example, the 
prohibition of unauthorized entry into the White House diminishes the 
citizen’s opportunities to gather information he might find relevant to 
his opinion of the way the country is being run, but that does not make 
entry into the White House a First Amendment right.  The right to speak 
and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather in-
formation.
182
  
 
181 Justice Stevens, for instance, made this argument in his dissent in Press-Enterprise 
Co. v. Superior Court:  
 I have long believed that a proper construction of the First Amendment 
embraces a right of access to information about the conduct of public affairs.   
     “As Madison wrote:   
    “‘A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of 
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy . . . .’” 
478 U.S. 1, 18 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MAD-
ISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910)); see also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 30 
(1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
 The theme has been sounded as well by Justice Brennan in Richmond Newspapers v. 
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 584-89 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); Justice 
Powell in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-64 (1974) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing);  Justice Douglas in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 839-842 (1974) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting); and Justice Stewart in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728 (1972) (Stewart, 
J., dissenting). 
182 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965); see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612-14 (1999) 
(holding that media “ride-alongs” could not constitutionally accompany search of a 
private home); Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691 (“It would be frivolous to assert . . . that the 
First Amendment, in the interest of securing news or otherwise, confers a license on 
either the reporter or his news sources to violate valid criminal laws.”), quoted with ap-
proval in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532 n.19 (2001); cf. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 
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The Court has rejected efforts by media plaintiffs to require pris-
ons to make exceptions to regulations governing prison visits in order 
to allow interviews of designated inmates or to gain access to prisons 
to videotape the facilities, declaring that, while “[t]here is an un-
doubted right to gather news ‘from any source by means within the 
law,’ . . . that affords no basis for the claim that the First Amendment 
compels others—private persons or governments—to supply informa-
tion.”183  The Court has recognized a limited First Amendment right of 
access to public trials and proceedings.184  But it has held that the gov-
ernment is under no obligation to provide copies of tape recordings 
entered into evidence185 or of arrest records in its control.186 
 
408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972) (upholding denial of entry to a foreign speaker invited to 
academic conferences on grounds of foreign affairs power). 
183 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 11 (plurality opinion) (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-
82); see also id. at 15 (noting that the First Amendment does not mandate “a right of 
access to government information or sources of information within the government’s 
control”); Pell, 417 U.S. at 834 (denying media plaintiffs access to interview particular 
inmates); Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 849-50 (holding that prohibiting interviews of particular 
inmates does not violate the First Amendment). 
 Pell and Saxbe were 5-4 decisions.  Due to recusals in Houchins, Chief Justice Burg-
er’s plurality spoke for only himself and two others.  Justice Stevens was joined by two 
Justices in dissent.  Justice Stewart’s concurrence in the judgment, which was necessary 
to form a majority, rejected a categorical “right of access to information generated or 
controlled by government.”  Houchins, 438 U.S. at 16.  But Justice Stewart also deter-
mined that, since the public was granted personal access to prison tours, the First 
Amendment required that media visitors be allowed to bring “cameras and recording 
equipment for effective presentation to the viewing public.”  Id. at 18.  Although Jus-
tice Stewart’s opinion is technically determinative, many subsequent cases and com-
mentators have treated the plurality as stating the law.  See e.g.,  L.A. Police Dep’t v. 
United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40 (1999); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 
U.S. 401, 411 n.10 (1989).   
184 E.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986); Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 501-05 (1984); Richmond Newspapers, 448 
U.S. at 581 (plurality opinion).  The Court has not, however, recognized a right to pho-
tograph trials that are required to be open to the public.  Cf. Chandler v. Florida, 449 
U.S. 560, 574-75 (1981) (acknowledging that the television broadcast of a trial may some-
times violate due process but declining to adopt an absolute ban on coverage); Estes v. 
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 534-35 (1965) (holding that televising trial proceedings infringed on 
the right to a fair trial); In re Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 564 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2009) (limit-
ing webcasts of civil nonevidentiary motion hearings); Rice v. Kempker, 374 F.3d 675, 
679-80 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that “the Media Policy banning the use of video cameras 
and other cameras in the execution chamber does not burden any of [Plaintiff’s] First 
Amendment rights” and citing other relevant cases for support). 
185 See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978) (rejecting a 
claim that “copies of the White House tapes-—to which the public has never had physi-
cal access-—must be made available for copying”). 
186 See United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. at 40 (“This is not a case in which the 
government is prohibiting a speaker from conveying information that the speaker al-
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The Court rebuffed an argument that a First Amendment right to 
gather information required an exception to the law of promissory es-
toppel where a newspaper published the name of a source to whom it 
had promised confidentiality.  The majority in Cohen v. Cowles Media 
Co. declared: 
[G]enerally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply 
because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its 
ability to gather and report the news. . . . The press may not with impuni-
ty break and enter an office or dwelling to gather news. . . . “The pub-
lisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of 
general laws.”
187
  
Citing these cases, some commentators maintain that because 
prohibitions on recording of information are “generally applicable,” 
they raise no First Amendment concerns.188  This is not, and should 
not be, the law.  To derive the claim that every “generally applicable” 
limit on the flow of information is immune from First Amendment 
scrutiny is to detach the decided cases from the facts and principles in 
which they are rooted. 
The Court’s cases reject a claimed right to “compel[] others . . . to 
supply information.”189  They deny an “unrestrained right to gather” 
information by engaging in conduct beyond mere inquiry or observa-
tion.190  But prohibiting the capture of images that photographers can 
observe with their own eyes and ears does not protect against “com-
pelled” disclosure of information; rather, it prohibits recording in-
formation that has already been voluntarily released.  A statute that 
forbade reporters from interviewing sources or observing public activi-
ties and recording their notes would manifestly violate First Amend-
 
ready possesses. . . . California could decide not to give out arrestee information at all 
without violating the First Amendment.”). 
187 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991) (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 
132 (1937)). 
188 See, e.g., Richards, supra note 179, at 1187-90.  To be fair, Professor Richards 
acknowledges that “[o]ne can imagine science fiction-style hypotheticals that would 
bring information collection rules within [First Amendment protection]—for exam-
ple, a law forbidding the keeping of records or outlawing cameras.”  Id. at 1189.  It may 
be that reality is overtaking science fiction. 
189 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (plurality opinion); see also Fla. 
Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 534 (1989) (“To the extent sensitive information rests in 
private hands, the government may under some circumstances forbid its nonconsen-
sual acquisition . . . .”). 
190 See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (“The right to speak and publish does not car-
ry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.”); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 
408 U.S. 665, 683-85 (1972) (listing limitations on news gathering). 
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ment constraints.191  Given the role that image capture plays in the 
emerging ecology of digital visual communication, the effect of blan-
ket prohibitions on image capture raises similar concerns. 
Prohibitions of image capture are not directed against the “ga-
thering” of information from unwilling sources; they bar the act of re-
cording for future review impressions already gathered by observers.  
The exemption of “generally applicable” regulations from First 
Amendment scrutiny does not extend to regulations that have “the 
inevitable effect of singling out those engaged in expressive activity” 
or rules that prohibit activity “intimately related to expressive conduct 
protected under the First Amendment.”192  Image capture is such an 
activity.  Laws that prohibit the capture of images by definition inter-
fere with the individual practice of preserving experience for future 
 
191 See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1979) (“[R]espondents 
relied upon routine newspaper reporting techniques . . . . A free press cannot be made 
to rely solely upon the sufferance of government to supply it with information.”); 
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681 (“[W]ithout some protection for seeking out the news, free-
dom of the press could be eviscerated.”); cf. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 11 (recognizing “a 
First Amendment right to receive letters from inmates criticizing jail officials and re-
porting on conditions,” “to interview those who render the legal assistance to which 
inmates are entitled,” and “to seek out former inmates, visitors to the prison, public 
officials, and institutional personnel”) (citations omitted)). 
192 Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706 n.3, 707 (1986); see also Turner 
Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1994) (plurality opinion) (discussing the 
danger of laws that “single out the press” in justifying heightened scrutiny). 
 Since Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991), the Court has recognized 
that, in prosecuting groups’ efforts to instruct “terrorist organizations” in humanita-
rian law, a “generally applicable” prohibition of “material support” raises First 
Amendment issues.  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2722-30 
(2010).  It applied First Amendment scrutiny, albeit of a more forgiving variety, to 
“generally applicable” prohibitions of public nudity applied to erotic dancing.  City of 
Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289, 296 (2000) (plurality opinion); Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1991) (plurality opinion).  And it rejected the 
proposition that the “generally applicable” copyright system was “‘categorically im-
mune from challenges under the First Amendment.’”  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 
221 (2003) (quoting Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001)); see also BE&K 
Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 522, 524 (2002) (holding that the First Amendment 
prohibited sanction of employers for violating the National Labor Relation Act’s “gen-
erally applicable” prohibition on “restraining, coercing, or interfering with employees’ 
exercise of rights related to self-organization” by bringing a lawsuit (citing the National 
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (2000)). 
 Indeed, as Professor Volokh has noted, many of the classic First Amendment cases 
from Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 
(1919), and Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), through Cohen v. California, 403 
U.S. 15 (1971) involved “generally applicable” criminal statutes applied to speech.  Eu-
gene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situa-
tion-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1287-94 (2005). 
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review, reflection, and expression—a practice that is entitled to pro-
tection under the First Amendment. 
Bartnicki v. Vopper illustrates the point.  In Bartnicki, the Court re-
viewed application of a statute that imposed liability for “disclosure” of 
the contents of an illegally intercepted wire or oral communication.193  
The Court concluded that the statute “is in fact a content-neutral law 
of general applicability.”194  But rather than forgoing First Amendment 
review, it went on to find that the prohibition on disclosure violated 
the First Amendment as applied both to a radio commentator who 
broadcasted the contents of a telephone conversation intercepted by 
an anonymous source, and to the citizen who received the recording 
from that source and conveyed it to the commentator.195  The Court 
assumed that the act of “obtaining the relevant information unlawfully” 
could be subject to sanction,196 but it determined that “the naked pro-
hibition against disclosures is fairly characterized as a regulation of 
pure speech.”197  As a “regulation of pure speech”—applicable by its 
terms against recognized media of expression—it was subject to the 
First Amendment precept that publication of “‘lawfully obtain[ed] 
truthful information about a matter of public significance’” may not 
be punished “‘absent a need . . . of the highest order.’”198  The Court 
weighed the interests advanced by the prohibition and ultimately 
found them wanting. 
Legal interventions that target image capture go beyond protec-
tion against “compelling” unwilling parties to “supply” information.  
The images in question have already been “supplied” to the observer 
who seeks to record them, and indeed, in many cases, to the world at 
large.  Emerging efforts to constrain image capture do not target ac-
tions collateral to expression—they sanction the disposition of infor-
mation itself.  Like prohibitions on sketching, taking notes, or memo-
rializing observations in a diary, they bar individuals who have already 
 
193 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517 (2001).  The statutes at issue were 18 
U.S.C. § 2511 (2000) and 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5725(a) (2000).  
194 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526. 
195 Id. at 526-27.  
196 Id. at 532 n.19. 
197 Id. at 526; see also id. at 527 (reasoning that the relevant subsection of the 
federal statute was “not a regulation of conduct”); id. at 527 n.11 (“[W]hat gave rise 
to . . . liability . . . was the information communicated on the tapes”); id. at 530 n.13 
(distinguishing “mail theft and stolen property,” which do not “involve prohibitions 
on speech”). 
198 Id. at 528 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 
U.S. 97, 103 (1979)). 
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acquired information from preserving it for future review, reflection, 
and dissemination.  As such, they are not “generally applicable” regu-
lations of conduct that adventitiously interfere with speech; rather 
they are targeted regulations in which the very definition of violation 
involves interference with a medium of expression.  They are fully sub-
ject to scrutiny under the First Amendment. 
B.  Image Capture, Privacy, and First Amendment Limits 
To conclude that the constraints on image capture are not “gen-
erally applicable” laws free of First Amendment scrutiny, of course, 
does not establish that they are invalid.  A final set of commentators 
maintains that despite incursions on the exercise of free expression, 
efforts to protect privacy by precluding image capture invoke suffi-
ciently weighty interests to overcome First Amendment constraints.199 
The Court has carefully avoided broad resolution of the balance 
between claims of privacy and the interests of free speech.200  Nor has 
the Court directly addressed the more precise First Amendment status 
of image capture.201  In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court stated that the in-
terest in privacy supported punishing “private wiretapping” which “ob-
tain[ed] . . . information unlawfully.”202  But it wrote narrowly, limiting 
its discussion to the particular facts presented.203 
Nonetheless, guidelines emerge from more general First Amend-
ment principles.  The Court has upheld rules that constrain expression 
 
199 E.g., Solove, supra note 180, at 983-94, 1028-29. 
200 See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530, 533 (1989) (“[T]he sensitivity and signi-
ficance of the interests presented in clashes between First Amendment and privacy 
rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the ap-
propriate context of the instant case.”).  In Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 
(2001), the Court approved the approach of Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 
(1967), which “reserve[ed] the question whether truthful publication of private mat-
ters unrelated to public affairs can be constitutionally proscribed.” 
201 Cf. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 156 (2004) (declining to reach First 
Amendment claims on procedural grounds); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-40 
(1965) (discussing freedom of the press to access court proceedings without discussing 
the act of filming). 
202 532 U.S. at 532 n.19 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972)); 
see also id. at 529 (“We assume that those interests adequately justify the prohibi-
tion . . . against the interceptor’s own use of information that he or she acquired by 
violating [the wiretapping statute].”); cf. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 534 (“To the extent sensi-
tive information rests in private hands, the government may under some circumstances 
forbid its nonconsensual acquisition . . . .”). 
203 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529 (“Our refusal to construe the issue presented more 
broadly is consistent with the Court’s repeated refusal to answer categorically whether 
truthful publication may ever be punished consistent with the First Amendment.”).   
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in recognized media under doctrines of copyright, defamation, and ob-
scenity, but it has imposed distinctive First Amendment limits on 
each.204  So, too, image capture may be subject to constraints imposed to 
vindicate weighty privacy interests, but only within the boundaries of 
First Amendment principle and practice.  Those boundaries substantial-
ly narrow the legitimate scope of prohibitions on image capture. 
Three general principles set initial boundaries.  First, where image 
capture is regulated to protect privacy, the state cannot rely on in-
choate invocations of that interest; a countervailing claim of privacy 
must be firmly grounded in the facts of the case in which it is invoked.  
Second, regulation must follow established legal rules that authorita-
tively recognize the scope of the privacy interest at stake and tailor the 
response to meet concerns of constitutional magnitude.  Catchall sta-
tutes and administrative retaliation invoked on the basis of standard-
less discretion do not meet this requirement.  Nor do claims of street-
level bureaucrats who maintain a right to discharge their duties in 
public without being recorded, nor those of private parties who seek 
to remove from the public domain images they have revealed to the 
public gaze.  Finally, where legal rules constraining image capture le-
gitimately seek to protect the privacy of intimate venues, analysis of 
the actual magnitude of the competing interests is required before 
liability can be sustained. 
1.  Retaliation and Catchall Statutes 
Where the government seeks to suppress image capture in the 
interests of privacy, at a minimum the intervention must be framed 
by legal rules that limit the intervention to the scope of an authorita-
tively defined public interest and that provide adequate standards 
for official decision.205 
 
204 For copyright, see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218-21 (2003), and Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).  For defamation, see 
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 522-23 (1991), Milkovich v. Lorain 
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22 (1990), Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 
U.S. 749, 763 (1985), and N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-85 (1964).  For 
obscenity, see Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1974), and Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973).  Compare R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 383 
(1992), which found that while obscenity and libel can be regulated, they are not “cat-
egories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution.” 
205 Cf. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 536 (“Even assuming the Constitution permitted a State 
to proscribe receipt of information, Florida has not taken this step.”); Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-
27 (holding that prohibitions of obscenity must involve images or descriptions of sexual 
conduct “specifically defined by the applicable state law”); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296, 311 (1940) (finding that “in the absence of a statute narrowly drawn to define 
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Obviously, raw exertion of official power does not meet this stan-
dard; use of official discretion to retaliate for the exercise of an activity 
protected by the First Amendment is itself a constitutional violation.206  
Arrests in retaliation for image capture constitute violations of First 
Amendment rights.  This is no small point, for, as discussed in Section 
III.C above, one growing source of litigation is the tendency of police 
officers to arrest photographers on trumped-up charges both as a way of 
preventing the spread of inconvenient truths and as a response to free-
floating anxiety about individuals who remind officials of terrorists.   
The constraints of First Amendment doctrine also preclude the 
use of broadly worded statutes that give unbridled authority to law en-
forcement officers to sanction image capture.  In City of Houston, Texas 
v. Hill, the Court held that a statute that punished those who “oppose, 
molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman in the execution of his duty” 
could not be constitutionally applied to “verbal interruptions of police 
officers.”207  Justice Brennan observed for the majority:  “The Constitu-
tion does not allow such speech to be made a crime.  The freedom of 
individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without the-
reby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we 
distinguish a free nation from a police state.”208  Allowing statutes that 
prohibit “interfering with an officer” or “disobeying an officer” to pu-
nish inconvenient image capture puts police officers in the constitu-
tionally impermissible position of censoring critical expression with 
unconstitutional impunity.209 
 
and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial 
interest of the State,” the plaintiff could not be convicted of disturbing the peace). 
206 See, e.g., Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (“Official reprisal for pro-
tected speech ‘offends the Constitution’ . . . and the law is settled that as a general mat-
ter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual 
to retaliatory actions, including criminal prosecutions, for speaking out.” (citations 
omitted) (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 n.10 (1998))). 
207 482 U.S. 451, 455, 461 (1987) (quoting Houston’s Code of Ordinances) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted) . 
208 Id. at 462-63 (footnote omitted). 
209 See supra note 170 (citing examples of First Amendment strictures against vest-
ing law enforcement officials with limitless discretion); cf. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 
566, 572-73 (1974) (“[T]he due process doctrine of vagueness . . . requires legislatures 
to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in or-
der to prevent ‘arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’” (quoting Grayned v. City 
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972))); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09 (condemning del-
egation of “basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an 
ad hoc and subjective basis” as “impermissibl[e]”); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 
(1965) (“[T]he practice . . . [of] allowing unfettered discretion in local officials in the 
regulation of the use of the streets for peaceful parades and meetings” violates the First 
Amendment.”); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308 (“[A] statute sweeping in a great variety of 
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2.  Torts and Statutes Protecting Privacy and Dignity 
In contrast to cases of retaliation or catchall statutes, targeted le-
gal rules that constrain image capture of intimate interactions poten-
tially invoke justifications of constitutional magnitude.  Again, Bart-
nicki v. Vopper is the most recent and illuminating case.210  Each of the 
opinions in Bartnicki recognized the potential importance of privacy 
of communication in “encouraging the uninhibited exchange of ideas 
and information among private parties.”211  And each invoked privacy 
as an “interest[] of the highest order.”212 
For the Bartnicki dissenters, the conjunction of these interests was 
more than sufficient to survive First Amendment scrutiny.  In Justice 
Breyer’s determinative concurring opinion, the application of the 
wiretap statutes required “a reasonable balance between their speech-
restricting and speech-enhancing consequences” because “important 
competing constitutional interests are implicated.”213  For Justice 
Breyer, “[a]s a general matter” that balance would sustain prohibi-
tions on wiretapping against First Amendment attack, although “as 
applied” to the republication at issue, the statutory prohibitions “do 
not reasonably reconcile the competing constitutional objectives.”214  
Even the Bartnicki majority emphasized the “important interests to be 
considered on both sides of the constitutional calculus” and left open 
the possibility of sanctioning “most violations of the statute without of-
fending the First Amendment.”215 
These justifications often suffice to justify bans on peeping Toms 
with cameras or surreptitious image capture of intimate conduct.  
 
conduct under a general and indefinite characterization . . . [left] to the executive and 
judicial branches too wide a discretion in its application.”).    
210 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
211 Id. at 532 (quoting Brief for the United States at 27, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 
(Nos. 99-1687, 99-1728)); see also id. at 537 (Breyer, J., concurring) (observing that sta-
tutes that enhance privacy also “encourage conversations that otherwise might not take 
place”); id. at 543, 547, 553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that privacy statutes 
“further the First Amendment rights of the parties to the conversation”). 
212 See id. at 518 (majority opinion); id. at 536, 538 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 
544 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); cf. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) 
(“[P]ress freedom and privacy rights are both ‘plainly rooted in the traditions and sig-
nificant concerns of our society.’” (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Connecticut, 420 U.S. 
469, 491 (1975))); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383 n.7 (1967) (discussing the con-
flict between the right of privacy and the rights of the press). 
213 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
214 Id. at 537-38. 
215 Id. at 533 (majority opinion). 
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They are, however, inapplicable to many of the restraints on image 
capture canvassed above. 
a.  Privacy, Dignity, and Public Officials 
Officials who invoke protections for privacy to justify punishing 
those who monitor public conduct mistake their own anxieties for 
constitutional justification. 
The privacy interests recognized in Bartnicki, like privacy interests 
that many commentators argue counterbalance the interest in free 
expression,216 guard free discourse by private citizens who use the shel-
ter of privacy to “think and act creatively and constructively.”217  When 
privacy functions to underpin democratic society, the interests in free 
expression may balance one another.  Suppression of free expression 
on the part of those who capture information may protect the free-
dom to converse of those whose words and images are captured. 
But officers confronting demonstrators, motorists, or the subjects 
of arrest—like other street-level bureaucrats providing services—
neither engage in dialogue by which they define their private identi-
ties nor in discourse that contributes to public deliberation.  Many of 
the official subjects of image capture are not engaged in discourse of 
any sort.  Those who speak do so not as autonomous citizens working 
out their own thoughts and destiny, but as public servants carrying out 
their duties.  The Court recently emphasized that “when public em-
ployees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the em-
ployees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes” 
and can claim scant protection under guarantees of free expression 
designed to shield the discourse of citizens.218  A fortiori, they can 
claim no compelling right as citizens to shield that speech from being 
recorded.  Nor can public actors claim a right to preserve their per-
sonal dignity against public inspection when they carry out their du-
ties.  Justice Breyer noted in his concurrence in Bartnicki that protec-
tions against wiretapping not only “encourage conversations that 
 
216 See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 389 (2008) 
(“The ability to freely make up our minds and to develop new ideas . . . depends upon 
a substantial measure of intellectual privacy.”); Solove, supra note 180, at 990-97 (con-
sidering the effect of privacy on autonomy and “democratic self-governance”). 
217 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533 (quoting THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 202 
(1967) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 543 (Rehnquist, C.J., dis-
senting) (same). 
218 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
KREIMER FINAL REVISED 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/11/2011  2:31 PM 
2011] Pervasive Image Capture 397 
otherwise might not take place,” but they also protect opportunities 
for intimacy:  “[T]hey resemble laws that would award damages 
caused through publication of information obtained by theft from a 
private bedroom.”219  A police officer investigating a crime can assert 
no comparable right to intimacy with her suspects; still less can a pub-
lic official engaged in her duties on a public street.220  Certainly, law 
officials have no constitutionally cognizable or legitimate expectation 
that their actions remain unrecorded; on the contrary, the actions of 
public officials are by definition a matter of public concern.221 
b.  Privacy and Dignity in the Public Sphere 
The Supreme Court has suggested that the goal of protecting dig-
nity and autonomy interests against intrusion justifies some limits on 
free expression.  Lower courts have upheld efforts to sanction non-
consensual image capture of private parties in intimate situations un-
der both appropriately tailored video voyeurism statutes and privacy 
torts against First Amendment challenges.222 
 
219 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 537 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
220 See, e.g., Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(“‘[A] law enforcement officer’s actions while performing his public duties . . . do not 
fall within the activities to be protected under the Comment [h] to § 652D of Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts as a matter of ‘personal privacy.’” (quoting Cowles Publ’g Co. 
v. State Patrol, 748 P.2d 597, 605 (Wash. 1988))); Hornberger v. ABC, Inc., 799 A.2d 
566, 594 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (“[P]olice officers do not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy when they are interacting with suspects.” (citing Angel v. Wil-
liams, 12 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1993) and State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1992))); cf. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 540 (“[T]he subject matter of the conversa-
tion at issue here is far removed from that in situations where the media publicizes tru-
ly private matters.”); Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[The] 
interest in protecting private communication . . . is virtually irrelevant . . . where the 
intercepted communications involve a search by police officers of a private citizen’s 
home . . . .”). 
 The court in Commonwealth v. Hyde, which upheld a wiretap prosecution for re-
cording a police encounter, concluded that no First Amendment values were impli-
cated because “[t]he defendant was not prosecuted for making the recording; he was 
prosecuted for doing so secretly.”  750 N.E.2d 963, 969 (Mass. 2001).  That conclusion, 
as argued above, is simply erroneous. 
221 See Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284, 289 (1971) (recognizing that a police 
officer was a “public official” and holding that he was not entitled to damages for a 
press report that failed to include qualifying statements about his “official conduct”). 
222 Compare State v. Stevenson, 613 N.W.2d 90, 95 (Wis. 2000) (holding a video 
voyeurism statute unconstitutionally overbroad), and State v. Glas, 54 P.3d 147, 153 
(Wash. 2002) (en banc) (limiting a voyeurism statute to private places, because con-
trary construction “would sweep constitutionally protected conduct within the statute’s 
penumbra because it could encompass simply looking at someone appreciatively or 
desirously in a public place, such as a restaurant or a bar”), with State v. Townsend, No. 
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But allowing criminal or tort actions in the case of dissemination 
of a videotape of sexual assaults or intimate sexual interactions is a far 
cry from banning spontaneous image capture by the holders of cell 
phones in public venues or granting the subjects of such image cap-
ture broad authority to censor the memorialization of their images.  
Extant tort doctrine requires as a general matter that image capture 
constitute intrusion on “seclusion” or “private affairs or concerns” that 
is “highly offensive to a reasonable person” before a plaintiff may re-
cover damages.223  Prevailing doctrine generally precludes recovery for 
images captured in public, so long as the subjects of the images are 
“exhibited to the public gaze.”224 
Once we recognize that image capture is protected by principles 
of free expression, proposals to impose liability without observing the 
established limitations of privacy torts-–either by common law innova-
tion or by statute—raise serious constitutional questions.  Such liabili-
ty would facilitate interference with efforts by private individuals to 
preserve their observations for future review, reflection, and dissemi-
nation without any actual demonstration to a court of substantial 
countervailing privacy interests.225 
 
06-2637, 2007 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1007, at *5-6 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2007) (per cu-
riam) (noting that the statute narrowed to covert depictions of nudity “while that per-
son is nude in a circumstance in which he or she has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy” survives First Amendment scrutiny (quoting WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.09(2)(am)(1) 
(West 2008))) and Gilmer v. State, 244-KA-02236-SCT (¶ 29) (Miss. 2007) (declaring 
that a voyeurism statute which bars recording a person without consent “with a lewd 
intent . . . [in] a protected location” does not violate First Amendment). 
 For examples of cases upholding sanctions against intimate image capture, see su-
pra note 58.  See also Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g. Grp., 572 F.3d 1201, 1213 (11th Cir. 
2009) (finding that the publication of nude photographs of a female wrestler in Hustler 
after her sensational death did not qualify for the “newsworthiness exception to the 
right of publicity”). 
223 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
224 Id. at cmt. c (“Nor is there liability for observing him or even taking his photo-
graph while he is walking on the public highway, since he is not then in seclusion, and 
his appearance is public and open to the public eye . . . .”); cf. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 
U.S. 537, 553 (2007) (“The videotaping of ranch guests during the 2000 drive, while 
no doubt thoroughly irritating and bad for business, may not have been unlawful, de-
pending, among other things, upon the location on public or private land of the 
people photographed.”); Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 478 (Ala. 
1964) (“One who is a part of a public scene may be lawfully photographed as an inci-
dental part of that scene in his ordinary status.”). 
225 See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 539 (1989) (“Unlike claims based on the 
common-law tort of invasion of privacy, civil actions based on [a Florida statute] re-
quire no case-by-case findings that the disclosure of a fact about a person’s private life 
was one that a reasonable person would find highly offensive.” (citation omitted)). 
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The exclusion of images “exhibited to the public gaze” from the 
domain of the actionably private is no adventitious common law relic.  
First, release of information is often plausibly taken to waive rights to 
bar further dissemination.  Cases that refuse to impose liability on im-
age capture either civilly or criminally often emphasize that appear-
ance in a public venue waives any legitimate expectation that one’s 
image will remain private.226  The act of recording material available to 
the naked eyes and ears—and, a fortiori, words spoken to the listener as 
part of a conversation in public—cannot be said to involve the unto-
ward acquisition of information by the observer.  The information was 
proffered by the target. 
This account is incomplete since expectations of privacy depend in 
part on background legal principles.  If it is illegal to record an image 
of the pudendum of an individual who appears unclothed in public, 
perhaps nude public appearances should not constitute a voluntary 
waiver of the expectation of shelter from recording.227  The adoption of 
a legal prohibition on image capture, therefore, could be argued to es-
tablish the expectation of privacy that justifies its enforcement. 
 
 Florida Star is premised on the proposition that the information in question was 
“lawfully acquired.”  Id. at 535.  Once information has been released into the public 
sphere, however, a prohibition of recording cannot make it “unlawfully acquired.”  Sta-
tutory prohibition of recording cannot define lawfulness of acquisition.  Otherwise a 
law that simply says “close your eyes” could justify suppression of anything seen.   
226 E.g., Daily Times Democrat, 162 So. 2d at 476-77 (discussing exceptions to the 
“right of action for invasion of privacy”).  In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) 
(plurality opinion), the Court made a similar point. 
Concededly a police agent who conceals his police connections may write 
down for official use his conversations with a defendant and testify concerning 
them, without a warrant authorizing his encounters . . . . For constitutional 
purposes, no different result is required if the agent instead of immediately 
reporting and transcribing his conversations with defendant, either (1) simul-
taneously records them with electronic equipment which he is carrying on his 
person; (2) or carries radio equipment which simultaneously transmits the 
conversations . . . . 
Id. at 751 (citations omitted).  
227 Cf. Deibler v. State, 776 A.2d 657 (Md. 2001).   
We are all familiar with the legend of Lady Godiva who, in response to a 
commitment by her husband, Leofric, Earl of Mercia, to repeal onerous taxes 
levied on the people of Coventry if she dared to ride naked through the town, 
supposedly did so.  Part of that legend, added some 600 years after the event, 
was that one person in the town, a tailor named Tom, had the temerity to 
glance upon the noblewoman as she proceeded on her mission and was im-
mediately struck either blind or dead.  This probably-mythical tailor became 
known to history as Peeping Tom.  
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The waiver account gains force, however, when we notice that pro-
tection of privacy is linked to the protection of dignity.  When infor-
mation is wrested from private control, the dignity of the subject is un-
iquely affronted:  she and only she has been denied the right to be let 
alone accorded to her fellows.  She has been subjected to a disadvan-
tage which uniquely lowers her in the social order.  If the affront is 
“outrageous,” as extant tort doctrine requires, recording of informa-
tion may in turn be held to impinge on “interests of the highest or-
der.”228  But when the subject releases information into an uncon-
trolled environment, the question of dignity looks quite different.  If 
everyone on the street is regularly subject to having their foibles rec-
orded, the capture of an image of me picking my nose in public may 
embarrass me, but it does not deny my equal dignity.  Social practice 
rather than law establishes the relevant baseline of equal dignity.  The 
right to privacy does not encompass a dignity interest sufficient to 
prohibit recording the public face that every member of society dis-
closes to others.229 
Indeed, once information is released, it becomes an element of 
the lives of those who observe it as well as part of the lives of those who 
produce it.  The experience of viewing the arrest of my neighbor, or 
of seeing her wear an embarrassing party hat while strolling in public, 
is an element of my lived reality; likewise, the experience of hearing 
 
Id. at 658.  
228 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518 (2001); see also supra note 212 and ac-
companying text (describing how each of the opinions in Bartnicki used this concept).  
229 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534 (“‘Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees 
is a concomitant of life in a civilized community.  The risk of this exposure is an essen-
tial incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and 
of press.’” (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967))); Erznoznik v. City of 
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975) (“The plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that 
in our pluralistic society . . . ‘we are inescapably captive audiences for many purposes.’  
Much that we encounter offends our esthetic, if not our political and moral, sensibili-
ties.” (quoting Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970))); cf. United 
States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“Where the designed 
benefit of a content-based speech restriction is to shield the sensibilities of listeners, 
the general rule is that the right of expression prevails . . . .”). 
 In Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), the Court accorded constitutional stature 
to the unwilling listener’s “right to be let alone” in upholding a prohibition of “counse-
lors” who approach within eight feet of patients outside of medical facilities.  Hill, 530 
U.S. at 707-08, 710, 716-17 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  But the interest 
recognized involved avoiding personal confrontation, “persistence, importunity, fol-
lowing and dogging,” id. at 717 (quoting Am. Steel Foundaries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades 
Council, 257 U.S. 184, 204 (1921)) (internal quotation marks omitted), rather than a 
right to “privacy” in public. 
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her berate me or lie to me is as much my own as it is hers.230  A legal 
regime which gives my neighbor the right to preclude recording those 
experiences impinges on my control of my own recollections.  Expo-
sure of information to the public gaze provides public viewers a legi-
timate stake in the information that was absent before the exposure.231 
Once information is released into the public sphere, moreover, it 
becomes a part of the stock of experience from which public dis-
course and common culture are constructed.232  In the field of intel-
lectual property, constitutional challenges attend legal innovations 
that contract the sphere of publicly available information.233  It is fair 
 
230 Cf. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 632 (1990) (explaining that a witness 
could lawfully “divulge information of which he was in possession before he testified 
before the grand jury”); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (“Those who see 
and hear what transpired [in court] can report it with impunity.”); Stilp v. Contino, 
613 F.3d 405, 406, 408 (3d Cir. 2010) (enjoining the state from imposing civil or crim-
inal sanctions against a citizen who disclosed that he filed an ethics complaint against a 
public official); Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1211-12 (11th Cir. 2005) (declaring a 
state statute that prohibits disclosure of information obtained during a government 
investigation an unconstitutional abridgement of free speech); Kamasinski v. Judicial 
Review Council, 44 F.3d 106, 110-11 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that citizens may reveal 
their own speculations about judicial misconduct, but not the fact that a complaint was 
filed); First Amendment Coal. v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 479 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (clarifying that witnesses may not disclose contents of proceedings before a 
judicial review board, with the exception of their own testimony). 
231 Cf. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 
P.2d 1269, 1281-82 (Nev. 1995) (“By observing Berosini through the eye of his video 
camera . . . Gesmundo’s purpose was not to eavesdrop or to invade into a realm that 
Berosini claimed for personal seclusion.  Gesmundo was merely memorializing on tape 
what he and others could readily perceive.”); Tarus v. Borough of Pine Hill, 916 A.2d 
1036, 1045 (N.J. 2007) (“Today, hand-held video cameras are everywhere—attached to 
our computers . . . and even built into recent generations of mobile telephones.  The 
broad and pervasive use of video cameras at public events evidences a societal accep-
tance of their use in public fora.”). 
232 Cf. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918) (“[T]he in-
formation respecting current events contained in the literary production—is not the 
creation of the writer, but is a report of matters that ordinarily are publici juris; it is the 
history of the day.”), quoted with approval in Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
499 U.S. 340, 354 (1991).   
 The Court has, however, acknowledged some authority to limit commercial ex-
ploitation of otherwise available information.  See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575-76 (1977); Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 241. 
233 See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced, L.P., 505 
F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he information used in CBC’s fantasy baseball 
games is all readily available in the public domain, and it would be strange law that a 
person would not have a [F]irst [A]mendment right to use information that is availa-
ble to everyone.”); cf. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1083 (10th Cir. 2010) (conclud-
ing that First Amendment interests were overcome by substantial international copy-
right concerns); Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1194 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[O]nce the 
works at issue became free for anyone to copy, plaintiffs in this case had vested First 
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use to copy an image as part of the creation of new transformative 
works of authorship, and an effort to dilute that protection meets con-
stitutional objections.234  So, too, a legal doctrine which seeks to sup-
press the recording of images of public action raises First Amendment 
concerns that do not infect a doctrine that prevents others from seiz-
ing or compelling initial disclosures. 
A doctrine punishing capture of public images would vest in the 
plaintiff or prosecutor the right to truncate recollection and discus-
sion of matters experienced by the community, and to effectively edit 
the community’s memory.  Given the emergence of pervasive image 
capture, such a doctrine is unlikely to broadly inhibit the practice of 
recording public occurrences for most Americans.  Lior Strahilevitz 
notes that the impact—if impact there is—of the original privacy tort 
is most likely on “legally sophisticated parties,” like media defen-
dants.235  As a broad array of Americans begin as a matter of course to 
pervasively document their lives with image capture, most subjects of 
prohibition are not sophisticated legal actors.  They are unlikely to be 
 
Amendment interests in the expressions . . . .”); FMC Corp. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 
915 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1990) (“ABC is free to retain copies of any of FMC’s docu-
ments in its possession . . . in the name of the First Amendment.”). 
234 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-21 (2003) (explaining that fair 
use is part of the “traditional contours of copyright protection” necessary to harmonize 
the copyright regime with the First Amendment); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 
(2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the reproduction of a photographic image by a painter to 
comment on its meaning was “transformative,” satisfying the requirement for fair use); 
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the use of 
thumbnail reproductions by a search engine to provide search capability was fair use); 
L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 942 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding fair use 
of a video clip used in an opening montage); Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 
F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000) (determining that “transformation” of modeling photos “in-
to news . . . weigh[ed] in favor of fair use”).   
 Similar defenses apply to other intellectual property claims regarding use of images.  
See, e.g., United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 153 (2d Cir. 2007) (remanding for 
analysis of a First Amendment challenge to a federal statute prohibiting nonconsensual 
recording of live musical performances); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 
938 (6th Cir. 2003) (allowing a First Amendment defense to a federal trademark action 
for an artistic lithograph of plaintiff’s picture); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 
F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a magazine was entitled to a First 
Amendment defense against an action seeking damages for alteration of the plaintiff’s 
image); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 962 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (allowing a First Amendment defense to a federal trademark action and right 
of publicity action for parody baseball cards using caricatures of plaintiffs). 
235 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 919, 926 (2005) (“It is through the regulation of these legally sophisticated par-
ties that tort law may have a strong, albeit indirect, effect on ordinary people’s ex-
pectations of privacy.”). 
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informed of their potential liability, and the effect in establishing a 
norm protecting against allegedly problematic image capture is likely 
to be small.  But punishments of image capture are well adapted to se-
lective enforcement against political outsiders and those who annoy 
subjects with sufficient resources to mount litigation.  The editing of 
collective discursive resources that results from aggressive legal inno-
vations is thus likely to be of a sort particularly uncongenial to the 
flourishing of “wide-open” and “robust” public discussion.236 
C.  Image Capture in Nonpublic Venues 
1.  Participant Recording and Single Party Consent 
Matters become more complicated when legal doctrines address 
participants in smaller circles of interaction.  When I seek covertly to 
capture the images of my conversation with an acquaintance, or an in-
vestigator seeks to capture images of a target suspected of illicit activi-
ties in private, the claims of the subject of image capture are stronger.  
The subject has done nothing to reveal herself to the public gaze, and 
the capture and dissemination of her image singles her out for an im-
pingement on her privacy and dignity.  Moreover, by entering into pri-
vate dialogue with their interlocutors, or entering demonstrably private 
property, potential recorders strengthen the argument that they them-
selves have waived their First Amendment rights to capture images.237  
 
236 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); cf. L.A. Police Dep’t v. 
United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 42 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring) (leaving 
open the question of whether a policy “that allows access to the press . . . but at the same 
time denies access to persons who wish to use the information for certain speech purpos-
es, is in reality a restriction upon speech rather than upon access to government informa-
tion”); id. at 43 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[O]nce a State decides to make such a bene-
fit available to the public, there are no doubt limits to its freedom to decide how that 
benefit will be distributed.  California could not, for example, release address informa-
tion only to those whose political views were in line with the party in power.”); id. at 45-46 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing for appropriateness of constitutional challenge “when 
the State makes information generally available, but denies access to a small disfavored 
class . . . because the State’s discrimination is based on its desire to prevent the informa-
tion from being used for constitutionally protected purposes”); Legi-Tech, Inc. v. Keiper, 
766 F.2d 728, 731, 736 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that the state violated the First Amend-
ment if it permitted the public to access a state-maintained database of pending legisla-
tion, but refused access to “‘those entities which offer for sale the services of an electronic 
information retrieval system which contains data relating to the proceedings of the legis-
lature’” (quoting 1984 N.Y. Laws c.257, § 21(c), at 1821)). 
237 This is the argument of Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell:  Protecting Intimate 
Relationship Privacy Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 
916-17 (2006), and Neil M. Richards and Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path:  Reco-
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The interest in assuring that our private words and images are not 
conveyed against our will to a public audience is constitutionally cog-
nizable.238  And in some situations, that interest is sufficient to justify 
prohibition of image capture.  The constitutional magnitude of that 
interest, however, is constrained in three dimensions. 
First, we must distinguish between the capture and the distribu-
tion of images.  The interest in avoiding outside observation depends 
primarily on the distribution of captured images.  An invited observer 
who records images of her own interactions for her own future review 
has not subjected private occurrences to unconsented public exami-
nation.  Recording the image preserves memories of the observer’s 
own life, and in most situations it is implausible—and of dubious con-
stitutionality—to imply an agreement to forgo her own memory.239  It 
is only when and if the images are transmitted to others to whom the 
subject has forbidden distribution that cognizable invasions of privacy 
occur.  A prohibition on image capture is an indirect means of avoid-
ing this contingent harm.  Since image capture is protected by the 
First Amendment, justifying its prohibition as a means of preventing 
certain sorts of subsequent dissemination runs afoul of First Amend-
ment doctrine’s established hostility toward suppressing expression in 
order to interdict future harms that may be prosecuted directly.  As 
the Court recently reiterated, “‘[t]he normal method of deterring un-
 
vering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 177-80 (2007).  See also United States 
v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 606 (1995) (“As to one who voluntarily assumed a duty of 
confidentiality, governmental restrictions on disclosure are not subject to the same 
stringent standards . . . .” (citing Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 & n.3 
(1980) (per curiam))); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36-37 (1984) 
(finding no First Amendment right to disseminate matters obtained in discovery); cf. 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671-72 (1991) (enforcing a promise to 
hold information confidential). 
238 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001) (“[T]he disclosure of the con-
tents of a private conversation can be an even greater intrusion on privacy than the 
interception itself.”); cf. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 547, 549 (1965) (holding that the 
presence of television cameras in a courtroom denies due process because “[t]he im-
pact upon a witness of the knowledge that he is being viewed by a vast audience is 
simply incalculable” and because courtroom television subjects the defendant to a 
“form of mental—if not physical—harassment”), limited as to due process holding by 
Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 581 (1981). 
239 Matters would differ, of course, if the information were initially obtained with-
out direct and invited observation—as by wiretapping or technologically enhanced 
surveillance.  Video voyeurism statutes that target nonconsensual image capture in 
places and circumstances in which the victim has “a reasonable expectation of privacy” 
are consistent with this concern.  See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-605 (Supp. 2001) 
(making it “an offense for a person to knowingly photograph . . . an individual, when 
such individual is in a place where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy”).  
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lawful conduct is to impose an appropriate punishment on the person 
who engages in it.’”240 
Second, with respect to participant image capture in limited-
audience situations, most courts enforcing common law privacy con-
straints acknowledge that it is only “offensive” intrusion into private 
matters that warrants sanction.  Particularly salient public concern for 
the information at issue may provide a First Amendment basis for limit-
ing relief.  These concerns are often incorporated into the “offensive-
ness” element of tort actions for “intrusion on seclusion”241 and the 
“newsworthiness” defense in actions for dissemination of private 
facts.242  To the extent that targeted statutes or new torts barring image 
capture fail to incorporate such elements, they do not comport with 
constitutional requirements.243 
Third, the Court itself has concluded that distribution of recorded 
first-person observations does not impinge on the subject’s legitimate 
expectations of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes.244  This con-
clusion does not itself determine the weight of such expectations in 
First Amendment analysis, and some states have recognized legitimate 
 
240 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (quoting Bartnicki, 532 
U.S. at 529); see also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (invalidating a statute 
punishing distributors of leaflets as a way of discouraging littering by recipients). 
241 See, e.g., Sanders v. ABC, Inc., 978 P.2d 67, 77 (Cal. 1999) (finding that defen-
dants in the media may “negate the offensiveness element” by showing that their intru-
sion was for purposes of news-gathering); Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 
469, 493 (Cal. 1998) (arguing that given the public interest in news, some intrusion 
that might “otherwise be considered offensive” may be justified); cf. Hernandez v. Hill-
sides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1079-80 (Cal. 2009) (considering justification and “offen-
siveness” for video surveillance).  Video voyeurism statutes that incorporate an element 
of lewd intent also respond to this concern. 
242 See, e.g., Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1216-17, 1220-22 (10th Cir. 
2007) (refusing to find that the tort of public disclosure of private facts precluded the 
release of police officers’ identity in connection with sexual assault allegations). 
243 In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), the Court found re-
covery for publication of images consistent with First Amendment constraints where  
petitioner’s state-law right of publicity would not serve to prevent respondent 
from reporting the newsworthy facts about petitioners act . . . [and] neither 
the public nor respondent will be deprived of the benefit of petitioner’s per-
formance as long as his commercial stake in his act is appropriately recog-
nized.  Petitioner does not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his performance; 
he simply wants to be paid for it. 
Id. at 574, 578.  
244 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971) (plurality opinion); see also, 
e.g., United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 603-04 (9th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing be-
tween video images captured while informants are in the room and those captured in 
apparent privacy and citing relevant cases). 
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expectations of nonrecording and nondistribution of images observed 
as a matter of state privacy law.245  But to the extent that states do not 
recognize such expectations as legitimate and instead continue to al-
low law enforcement officials and government informers to record 
and distribute their observations without constraint, it becomes more 
difficult for such states to claim that immunity to private image cap-
ture is an interest “of the highest order.”246 
2.  Consensual First-Party Image Capture and “Sexting” 
Recording one’s own image usually risks no legal liability.  Howev-
er, as digital image capture capabilities encounter teenage hormones 
and impulsiveness in an increasingly sexualized environment, those 
technologies have unsurprisingly been turned to the service of teen-
aged sexual transgression.  Surveys indicate that the practice of “sext-
ing” sexually provocative self-images captured on cell phones or digi-
tal cameras to friends and romantic partners is widespread among 
teenagers.247  Prosecutors scandalized by graphic records of teen sex-
ual liaisons have begun to deploy statutes prohibiting the production 
of child pornography and obscenity against teenagers who memorial-
ize their sexual interactions with photographic images or who capture 
sexualized self-portraits and convey them to friends.248 
 
245 See 2 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES § 11.04(6) (4th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2010) (identifying 
states rejecting the Court’s holding in White); THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION:  A 
TREATISE ON RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES § 11.4(a) (Gormley et al. eds., 2004) (“[T]he 
Pennsylvania Courts have given the reasonable expectation of privacy concept 
a . . . robust interpretation.”); Melanie L. Black-Dubis, The Consensual Electronic Surveil-
lance Experiment:  State Courts React to United States v. White, 47 VAND. L. REV. 857, 865-
73 (1994) (discussing states that have provided constitutional protection against partic-
ipant recording). 
246 See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
247 See supra note 7 (surveying statistics on the transmission of sexually explicit 
images by teens). 
248 See supra notes 8, 70, 71.  For a thoughtful recent investigation of the First 
Amendment issues with respect to minors, see John A. Humbach, ‘Sexting’ and the First 
Amendment, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433 (2010).  See also Clay Calvert, Sex, Cell Phones, 
Privacy, and the First Amendment:  When Children Become Child Pornographers and the Lolita 
Effect Undermines the Law, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1 (2009).   
 So too, recordkeeping regulations designed to suppress child pornography, which 
might apply to limit sexting between adults, raise First Amendment concerns.  See Free 
Speech Coal. v. Holder, No. 09-4607, 2010 WL 2982985, at *38-41 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 
2010) (declining to address application of federal recordkeeping statutes 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2257 & 2257A to adult sexting because the federal government disavowed intent to 
prosecute private and noncommercial expression). 
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“Sexting” usually manifests deplorable judgment on the part of 
the teenager involved.  The volatility of digital images raises the risk of 
potential embarrassment—and indeed trauma—if recipients retrans-
mit images.  But child pornography prosecutions against teenagers 
who take or send sexualized pictures of themselves raise substantial 
First Amendment questions. 
In its initial determination that, unlike obscenity, production and 
possession of “child pornography” can be prosecuted without refer-
ence to the images’ potentially redeeming value, the Court observed 
that “laws directed at the dissemination of child pornography run the 
risk of suppressing protected expression by allowing the hand of the 
censor to become unduly heavy.”249  In Osborne v. Ohio, the Court ac-
knowledged that it was the special harms of the sexual abuse of child-
ren that justified the exception to First Amendment protections.  If “a 
parent gave a family friend a picture of the parent’s infant taken while 
the infant was unclothed,” prosecution of either the parent or the re-
cipient would “criminalize[] constitutionally protected conduct.”250 
In contrast to images obtained by subjecting a child to sexual abuse, 
teenage sexting—at least where there is no statutory prohibition against 
the underlying conduct recorded—like the computer-generated images 
protected in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, “records no crime and 
creates no victims by its production.”251  Personal communication be-
tween actual or prospective romantic partners can claim protection un-
der the First Amendment.252  Notwithstanding the reactions of scanda-
lized prosecutors, teenagers who email or text a nude picture of 
themselves to a boyfriend or a girlfriend should be treated no different-
ly for purposes of the First Amendment than teenagers a generation 
 
249 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982). 
250 495 U.S. 103, 113 n.9 (1990); see id. at 115 n.11 (“We do not concede . . . that 
the statute as construed might proscribe a family friend’s possession of an innocuous 
picture of an unclothed infant.”). 
251 535 U.S. 234, 250 (2002); see id. at 249 (stating that the “child pornography” 
exception to First Amendment doctrine rests on the proposition that the material in 
question is “the product of child sexual abuse”). 
252 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001) (noting the importance of 
private conversations); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409 (1974) (finding the 
private correspondence between a prison inmate and his wife protected by the First 
Amendment), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401; Red-
mond v. United States, 384 U.S. 264, 264-65 (1966) (per curiam) (granting the Solici-
tor General’s motion to vacate and remand with instructions to dismiss obscenity pros-
ecution of a husband and wife who mailed “undeveloped films of each other posing in 
the nude to an out-of-state firm for developing”); cf. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 
486 (1965) (holding that there must be heightened protection against searches of pri-
vate correspondence and literary materials under a general warrant). 
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ago who handed a lover a nude self portrait in charcoal or oil paint, or 
a Polaroid photo. 
There is, to be sure, much more to be said to fully analyze the 
problem of sexting.  Further dissemination of images by recipients, for 
example, may raise different issues, both because the subjects have not 
consented to the distribution, and because potential harms rise expo-
nentially as material disperses over the Internet.  A teenager who en-
gages in commercial distribution of his or her sexualized image can 
legitimately be subject to strictures against commercialized pandering 
that would apply to his adult counterpart.  And where images capture 
activities prohibited under statutory rape laws, further concerns would 
arise.  But such justifications must meet the threshold for regulation 
of expression:  sexting, like other forms of image capture and distribu-
tion, cannot be treated as conduct invisible to the First Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Kennedy’s recent majority opinion in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission observed that “television networks and major news-
papers owned by media corporations,” which have become our society’s 
“most salient media,” are a form unimagined by the Framers of the First 
Amendment.253  But, he continued, “that does not mean that those 
speakers and media are entitled to less First Amendment protection 
than those types of speakers and media that provided the means of 
communicating political ideas when the Bill of Rights was adopted.”254 
With the diffusion of digital image technology in the last decade, 
pervasive image capture and sharing has become an increasingly “sa-
lient” medium of expression both in public and in private.  In public, 
pervasive image capture grants authority to a range of unofficial voices; 
it provides a means of holding the conduct of the powerful to account.  
Pervasive image capture provides important elements of public dis-
course both in the “networks and major newspapers owned by media 
corporations,” and in the listservs, blogs, and social networking web-
sites that Justice Kennedy’s opinion identified as the dynamic succes-
sors of currently established media.255  In private, it lays the basis of in-
terpersonal connection in a centrifugal age.  Image capture memor-
ializes personal experience and enables us to remember and reflect 
upon our lives.  As culture critic Susan Sontag has observed, “In an era 
 
253 130 S. Ct. 876, 906 (2010). 
254 Id. 
255 Id. at 913. 
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of information overload, the photograph provides a quick way of ap-
prehending something and a compact form for memorizing it.”256  
When we recognize these propositions, it follows that the First 
Amendment protects the right to record images we observe as part of 
the right to form, reflect upon, and share our memories. 
 
 
256 SUSAN SONTAG, REGARDING THE PAIN OF OTHERS 22 (2003). 
